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SHOULD LEGAL PRECEDENT BASED ON OLD, FLAWED, SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS 
REGARDING WHEN LIFE BEGINS, CONTINUE TO APPLY TO PARENTAL 
DISPUTES OVER THE FATE OF FROZEN EMBRYOS, WHEN THERE ARE NOW 
SCIENTIFICALLY KNOWN AND OBSERVED FACTS PROVING LIFE BEGINS AT 
FERTILIZATION? 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The author submits that previous court decisions about the fate of stored embryos are 
flawed because they are not based on the current observable scientific facts of the behavior and 
composition of the human embryo, which has been scientifically identified as a human organism 
and an identifiable member of the same species of those who decide his or her fate. 
 Scientists now have films of early human embryo development revealing the behavior and 
composition of the embryo: from the time before the maternal and paternal pronuclei move to the 
center of the one cell human embryo, known as a zygote; through the time the chromosomes line 
up on a cleavage spindle to replicate the chromosomes in the next cell; through the development 
of each subsequent cell in the embryo; and, through the blastocyst stage of development, when the 
embryo contains the pluripotent cells, on which some scientists wish to do research.1  At the 
                                                          
1 Ronan O’Rahilly & Fabiola Muller, Human Embryology & Teratology, NEW YORK: WILEY-
LISS at 89 (1996). See also Stem Cell Key Terms, CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., 
https://www.cirm.ca.gov/patients/stem-cell-key-terms (last visited May 7, 2018). Pluripotent 
cells can become any cell in the human body compared to totipotent cells that give rise to 
placenta cells and human body cells. Pluripotent: Stem Cell Information – Glossary, NAT’L INST. 
OF HEALTH – DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., 
https://stemcells.nih.gov/glossary.htm#pluripotent (last visited May 14, 2018). Pluripotent cells 
cannot sustain full organismal development.  Totipotent cells by division create the whole 
organism. Totipotent: Stem Cell Information – Glossary, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH – DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., https://stemcells.nih.gov/glossary.htm#totipotent (last visited May 14, 
2018). 
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blastocyst stage of development, the inner cell mass, not the placental cells, but the stem cells 
which make the human body, are more easily seen in the embryo, and there is a difference between 
mere cells in the embryo and the embryos who are human organisms, human beings, and that 
biological difference can affect legal determinations that differentiate between human stem cells 
and human embryos.2  
Observable facts of human development can be seen in films of one cell human embryos 
that were cryopreserved in a period of years before 2002, filmed in 2008, and reported in 
scientific journals and lectures after 2010.3  Misconceptions in previous court precedent that 
embryos in storage were mere undifferentiated cells or reproductive tissue, misled subsequent 
courts to resolve embryo disposition disputes by: (a) incorrectly framing the issue as one of 
division of marital property; (b) invoking a parents’ so-called, but non-existent, “right not to 
procreate;” (c) ignoring the embryos' own interest in continued life; and (d) discounting the 
parents' constitutional rights to familial association with, and desire to care for and protect, their 
procreated child-in-being.   
By recognizing that human embryos are human beings, courts are faced with parental 
disputes over the fate of created embryos to: (a) recognize that in deciding the disposition of 
human embryos they are determining the custody and fate of human beings, not marital property; 
(b) reject the so-called  “right not to procreate” as inapplicable, because in the case of 
cryopreserved or vitrified  embryos purposeful procreation has already occurred; (c) evaluate 
contracts that describe embryos as mere property as  invalid,  under known scientific fact, refuse 
                                                          
2 See Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 779 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. den. U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 12-454 
(2013).   
3 Connie C. Wong et al., Non-invasive imaging of human embryos before embryonic genome 
activation predicts development to the blastocyst stage, 28 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1115, 
1119-20, fig.6 (2010). 
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to allow contract law to condemn human life, and only consider actual advance directives 
concerning the embryos, in light of the embryos' best interests, and include the best interests of 
the embryos in the calculus leading to a disposition decision; and (d) consider as well the parents' 
constitutional rights and desire to bear, care for, and protect their unborn child(ren). 
This article reports on the scientific facts observed about embryonic development, and 
particularly human embryonic development, subsequent to the decision of Roe v. Wade,4  wherein 
the Court stated that it did not know when life began, and the 1992 seminal case of  Davis v. Davis,5 
wherein the Tennessee Supreme Court in dicta, reviewed the scientific evidence on the nature of 
the human embryo and adopted a legal status of “special respect,” a status between personhood 
and property to be given to the human “pre-embryo.”6  This article discusses the progeny of 
embryo cases since Davis, and questions whether legal precedent will continue to fail to take 
judicial notice of the human status of the human embryo. 
Among the symbolic sculptures at the exit of the United States Supreme Court is a statue 
of a turtle which signifies that the law is slow to change. Now, forty-four years after Roe v. Wade, 
it is the time to re-examine scientific facts of human development based on the current scientific 
knowledge and allow the turtle of law to move to the point of recognizing that the law should 
protect human beings equally whether in vitro (in glass) or (in vivo in a uterus). In both cases the 
law must realize that it is dealing with human beings. 
THE SCIENCE 
II. SCIENTISTS KNOW THAT HUMAN LIFE BEGINS AT FERTILZATION AND THE 
NATURE OF THE CREATION. 
 
                                                          
4 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973). 
5 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
6 Id. at 597. 
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The question of when human life begins is no longer a mystery, but an observable fact and 
the data of human development is collected and reported on internet references, such as the Virtual 
Human Embryo (VHE), a 14,250-page illustrated atlas of human embryology, which describes the 
twenty-three stages of observations in human development called the Carnegie Stages.7  The 
Carnegie Stages are named for a U.S. Institute which began collecting and classifying embryos 
based on external or internal morphological features to standardize twenty-three stages of human 
development.8  Through the VHE, databases of film, research data, and explanation of scientific 
terms and source material are available for each of the Carnegie twenty-three stages of Human 
Development. 
The opinion in Roe was made before the use of in vitro fertilization procedures, to conceive 
human individuals such as Louise Brown, born July 25, 1978.  In the last forty-four years since 
Roe, scientists have been able to use time lapse photography to observe the development of human 
embryos.9  
Renee Reijo Pera, Ph.D., former professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Stanford 
Medical School and former Director of the Center for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research at 
Stanford’s Institute for Stem Cell Biology and Reproductive Medicine, (who is now at Montana 
State University as Vice President for Research Creativity and Technology Transfer), studied and 
                                                          
7 The Virtual Human Embryo, THE ENDOWMENT FOR HUMAN DEV., 
www.prenatalorigins.org/virtual-human-embryo/ (last accessed Aug. 17, 2017).  
8 Id. 
9 Connie C. Wong et al., Non-invasive imaging of human embryos before embryonic genome 
activation predicts development to the blastocyst stage, 28 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1115 
(2010).   
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recorded in 2008, the early development of one-hundred out of two-hundred-forty-two one cell 
human embryos created prior to 2002.10   
The embryos had been preserved in a frozen state from a one cell or zygote stage of 
development twelve to eighteen hours after fertilization.11  The scientists filmed the embryos with 
time-lapse video microscopy until the embryos had developed many cells in a hollow sphere ball 
shape called a blastocyst as seen in Blastocyst Day 3-6 Movie.12  The study found that cells within 
the early human embryo developed on a self-determined schedule (first 1, then 2, then 3, then 4, 
then 5, then 6, etc.,) and not in synchrony (not 2, 4, 6, 8, or 8 become 16 at the same time).13  Each 
cell was making autonomous decisions.14  Embryonic genes to develop the body were active in the 
embryo at the eighth-cell stage.15  At the eighth-cell stage, not all cells expressed embryonic 
genes.16  These scientific facts support the conclusion that the early embryo cells perform different 
tasks such as in gene expression, and yet work in an integrated, coordinated organismic program 
to reveal the body plan and supportive structures.  They behave not as a cell aggregate, or mere 
tissue, but function as a developing human being with the cells working in an organized manner 
for the good of the organism’s growth and development, not simply for the good of the individual 
cell.  
                                                          
10 Krista Conger, Earlier, More Accurate Prediction of Embryo Survival Enabled by Research, 
Stanford News and Medicine (Oct. 3, 2010), https://med.stanford.edu/news/all-
news/2010/10/earlier-more-accurate-prediction-of-embryo-survival-enabled-by-research.html.  
11 Id.  
12 Blastocyst Day 3-6 Movie, EMBRYOLOGY (May 14, 2018), 
https://embryology.med.unsw.edu.au/embryology/index.php/Blastocyst_Day_3-6_Movie.  
13 Conger, supra note 10.  
14 Id.  
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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Similarly, other scientists, such as Nobel Prize recipient, Robert Edwards, who helped 
create the first human baby born from IVF procedures, Louise Brown, published his findings about 
the differences found in the cells of the early embryo.17  
Two of the cells in a four-cell embryo will often develop into the inner cell mass that has 
a role to play in body development.18  Another cell develops into the trophectoderm (the 
trophectoderm includes the placenta).19  The fourth cell of the four-cell stage will often develop 
into the germline, which will also play a role in human development.20  Even at the fourth-cell 
stage, protein distributions in each cell can be different.21  For example, the fourth cell with mostly 
vegetal cytoplasm has small amounts of proteins leptin and STAT 3, whereas two cells have 
intermediate amounts and a third cell with mostly animal cytoplasm has large amounts.22  In 
addition, mRNA expression of proteins such as B-HCG secretions are different in trophectoderm 
cells as compared to cells that will reveal the inner cell mass.23 
Scientist, Dr. Maureen Condic, who holds a doctorate in neurobiology from the 
University of California, Berkeley, and currently teaches human embryology as an Associate 
Professor of Neurobiology and Anatomy at the University of Utah School of Medicine, confirms, 
based on accepted scientific criteria, that human life begins at fertilization. Dr. Condic reports 
scientists determine when a new cell is formed based on two universal criteria, cell composition 
                                                          
17 Robert G. Edwards & Christopher Hansis, Initial differentiation of blastomeres in 4-cell 
human embryos and its significance for early embryogenesis and implantation, 11 
REPRODUCTIVE BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 206 (2005), https://www.rbmojournal.com/article/S1472-
6483(10)60960-1/pdf.  
18 Id. at 208. 
19 Id. 
20 Id.  
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 208-09.  
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and cell behavior.24  When sperm and egg plasma fuse in less than a second, a single cell is 
created that has a composition consisting of a gene set or genome that can be distinguished from 
the gene set of the sperm or the gene set of the egg.  The new cell has sperm and egg derived 
components, but the molecular composition is unique.25  The new cell immediately acts 
differently than either gamete and prepares to replicate.26  The new cell acts not as a mere human 
cell, but as an organism undergoing a self-directed process of maturation.27  Dr. Condic has 
given expert testimony to the same effect: “Thus the conclusion that a human zygote is a human 
being (i.e. a human organism) is not a matter of religious belief, societal convention or emotional 
reaction. It is a matter of observable, objective fact.”28 
Other scientists confirm Dr. Condic's statements.  Dr. Renee Reijo Pera, Ph.D., the Vice 
President of Research and Economic Development at Montana State University and former 
Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology and former Director of Stanford Center for Human 
Pluripotent Stem Cell Research and Education, said in a 2010 lecture that she discovered in her 
research that what makes us human “wasn't consciousness, and it wasn't love, and it wasn't 
spirituality, but it just is: on day one, a human sperm and a human egg come together and we 
have a human embryo.”29 
The scientific conclusion that human life begins at fertilization arises from scientists' 
                                                          
24 Maureen L. Condic, When Does Human Life Begin? The Scientific Evidence And Terminology 
Revisited, 8 UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 44, 46-47, 76-79 (2013). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 48. 
28 Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Inc., et .al, v. Commissioner of the Indiana State Department 
of Health, 794 F. Supp. 2d 892, 916-17 (2011); Affirmed in part and reversed in part by, 
Remanded by Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Department of 
Health, 699 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2012).  
29 IdeaCity, Renee Reijo Pera – Synthetic Human Reproduction, YOUTUBE (Sep. 1, 2010), 
https://youtube/mkHhTT5Qqsg. 
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observation of early embryonic development.  Dr. Condic's 2014 paper relied upon over one-
hundred scientific research papers from 1995 onward describing and analyzing twenty-six 
separate developmental changes in the early embryo from sperm-egg binding through days four 
through six.30  Her paper establishes that from the time of fertilization as a one-cell zygote, an 
embryo is not a mere collection or aggregate of cells, but an internally directed, dynamic 
organism. 
Dr. Condic’s paper points to confusing terminology describing the observable facts as 
causing disagreement over when life begins.  According to Dr. Condic, the word “zygote” 
properly describes the youngest (one-cell) embryo,31 yet, the Carnegie Stages of Early 
Embryonic Development, which employs twenty-three stages to describe human development in 
the first fifty-six days of life, uses “zygote” to describe the embryo only at the end of stage one 
(which has phases a, b and c), while using the term “penetrated oocyte” (oocyte is an egg) to 
refer to the embryo before phase one-c.32  According to Dr. Condic, this “pre-zygote error” 
(labeling a human embryo a “penetrated oocyte” before it develops into a “zygote”) ignores that 
immediately, i.e., within a quarter of a second after fertilization, the embryo’s cell composition 
and behavior -- the two principal characteristics determining cell classification -- change markedly 
from those of the sperm and oocyte individually.33  Dr. Condic explains:  
Modern scientific evidence demonstrates that the one-cell human embryo or 
zygote, is formed at the instant of sperm-egg plasma membrane fusion.  The zygote 
has unique material composition that is distinct from either gamete.  It immediately 
initiates a series of cellular and biochemical events that ultimately generate the 
cells, tissues and structures of the mature body in an orderly temporal and spatial 
                                                          
30 Condic, supra note 24, at 49-67. 
31 Id. at 47.  
32 Id. at 68-69. See O’Rahilly, supra note 1, at 89. See also Developmental Anatomy, NAT’L 
MUSEUM OF HEALTH & MED., 
http://www.medicalmuseum.mil/index.cfm?p=collections.hdac.anatomy.s01. 
33 Condic, supra note 24, at 44, 47, 68-69, 79. 
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sequence. The capacity to undergo development is a defining characteristic of a 
human organism at the beginning of life. The scientific evidence presented here 
refutes the long standing “pre-zygote error” promoted by the Carnegie stages that 
the zygote is not formed until syngamy, and therefore, the cell produced by the 
fusion of the gametes is nothing more than a “penetrated oocyte.”  Ethical positions 
that deny the personhood of a human being at all stages of life are logically 
inconsistent and scientifically unsound, in addition to having significant, negative 
implications for the ethical treatment of all human persons.34   
 According to Dr. Condic, a human embryo from the very start is markedly different from 
other human cells.  While human cells sustain their cellular life through complex behaviors, they 
do not have a higher level of organization transcending their cells.35  A human embryo, even as a 
single cell, is an organism, directing development first as a single cell, then in groups of 
interacting cells, tissues and structures, all in a specific spatial and temporal sequence.36  This 
process continues throughout the organism's life, ending only with its demise.  Cryostorage 
slows down the embryos' growth and metabolism, but they are still living human beings. 
Dr. Condic explains the differences between an organism and an aggregate of cells, such 
as tissues or organs.  While an aggregate of cells, “are alive and carry on the activities of cellular 
life, yet [they] fail to exhibit coordinated interactions directed towards any higher-level 
organization.”37  By contrast, an organism exhibits that “higher level” of organization, acting “in 
an interdependent and coordinated manner to ‘carry on the activities of life.’”38  An organism is 
                                                          
34 Id. at 47-48, 75. 
35 Id. at 48. HeLa cells are an example of cell aggregates that are not human organisms but can 
grow and multiply. See Sarah Zielinski, Cracking the Code of the Human Genome/ Henrietta 
Lack’s ‘Immortal’ Cells, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Jan. 22, 2010), 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/henrietta-lacks-immortal-cells-6421299/?no-ist.  
36 Condic, supra note 24, at 48.  
37 Maureen L. Condic, When Does Human Life Begin? A Scientific Perspective, 1 THE 
WESTCHESTER INST. FOR ETHICS & THE HUM. PERSON WHITE PAPER 1, 6 (2008). 
38 Id. Condic notes that the word “organism” is defined by the NIH medical dictionary as “(1) a 
complex structure of interdependent and subordinate elements whose relations and properties are 
largely determined by their function in the whole and (2) an individual constituted to carry on the 
activities of life by means of organs separate in function but mutually dependent:  a living 
being.” Id. at n.22.   
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distinguished by the interaction of its parts “in the context of a coordinated whole.”39  Cells and 
organs are parts of an organism; the organism is the whole, directing the parts from the moment 
of fertilization.  Condic elaborates on the organismic functioning of the zygote as follows: 
From the moment of sperm-egg fusion, a human zygote acts as a complete whole, 
with all the parts of the zygote interacting in an orchestrated fashion to generate the 
structures and relationships required for the zygote to continue developing towards 
its state....[t]he zygote acts immediately and decisively to initiate a program of 
development that will, if uninterrupted by accident, disease, or external 
intervention, proceed seamlessly through formation of the definitive body, birth, 
childhood, adolescence, maturity, and aging, ending with death.  This coordinated 
behavior is the very hallmark of an organism.40 
 
Condic concludes that the zygote, though only a single cell, “is not merely a unique 
human cell, but a cell with all the properties of a fully complete (human organism). . . .”41  Each 
of the scientific papers she cites in her 2014 paper (one-hundred-seventeen in all, dating from 
1995 to 2013) document the fact that “the embryo does not function as a mere human cell or 
group of human cells, it functions as an organism; a complete human being at an immature stage 
of development.”42  
In contrast to the research reported by Dr. Condic, in prior case law, the human embryos, 
human beings in development, human lives with full potential to complete life’s cycle, are 
improperly described as pre-embryos, pre-zygotes, cells, tissue, and property. A review of the 
case law in this paper examines the scientific misunderstanding of the facts regarding behavior 
and composition of the early developing human embryo in American embryo fate dispute case 
precedent, compared to the factual observations made by modern science about the nature of the 
early developing human embryo, and discusses the scientific understanding of the court as to the 
                                                          
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 7.  
41 Id.  
42 Condic, supra note 24, at 68. 
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nature of the embryo in the resulting decision on the fate of the embryos at issue. 
This article also addresses much of the legal precedent cited by courts and raised in amicus 
briefs that opine on how to best resolve a dispute between parents about the fate of the embryos 
they created.   The author urges the courts with embryo fate disputes before them to apply the law 
based on fact and not fiction, nor misconceived science from earlier case law that did not recognize 
the human embryo as a human organism, and a member of the same species that seeks to terminate 
or protect his or her future. 
THE PRECEDENT 
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN ROE v. WADE DECLINED TO ACKNOWLEDGE 
WHEN HUMAN LIFE BEGAN AND INCORRECTLY CHARACTERIZED THE STATE 
INTEREST AS AN INTEREST IN POTENTIAL HUMAN LIFE. 
 
In Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court said:  
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained 
in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to 
arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man’s 
knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.43 
 
Forty-three years later, scientists have determined with confidence the point at which a human 
life begins, and, thus, have overcome the uncertainty confessed by the Roe court concerning “the 
difficult question of when life begins.”44  Once procreation has occurred and human life has 
begun, the rights and interests at issue can no longer be framed as procreative or reproductive 
interests of the parents.  The rights and interests of the parents, the procreated human embryos, 
and government’s interest in protecting or experimenting on human life, must all be identified and 
weighed on the scales of justice.   
Roe, in its 1973 opinion, also, reported “new embryological data that purport to indicate 
                                                          
43 Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.  
44 Id. at 159.  
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that conception is a ‘process’ over time rather than an event . . . .”45  For the reasons discussed 
above and below, current human embryology establishes that indeed while human development 
is a process, lasting through the prenatal and postnatal life, it begins with a particular factually 
observable event: fertilization.  It is time for courts to recognize the facts that: (1) a new human 
life is created at sperm-oocyte binding; (2) that the parents who contribute their sperm or oocyte 
for the purpose of fertilization exercise their right to procreate at fertilization; (3) a zygote, a new 
human being can be individually identified apart from any other human beings; and, (4) that the 
newly created human being has full potential to complete the life cycle and direct his or her own 
development until he or she dies. 
 IV. A CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN LEGAL PRECEDENT IN 
ANALYZING THE FACTUAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO COURTS REGARDING 
WHEN PROCREATION OCCURS, THE NATURE OF THE EMBRYO, AND THE 
MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE SCIENTIFIC FACTS IN PRIOR CASES INVOLVING 
DISPUTES OVER WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DECIDE EMBRYONIC FATE. 
 
A. IN 1978, A JURY CORRECTLY FOUND VALUE IN THE LOSS OF CONTENTS 
OF A VIAL CONTAINING EGGS AND SPERM THAT WERE DELIBERTLY 
DESTROYED AND THAT SUCH DESTRUCTION CAUSED THE MOTHER WHO 
SOUGHT PARENTHOOD EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
 
A married couple seeking infertility treatment at a university facility in New York had 
provided eggs and sperm to be placed by health care providers in a vial in hopes of fertilization.46 
An informed consent was signed for the sperm and egg to combine in-vitro, or fertilization in 
glass, with the intent of an operation to place the embryo in the natural mother with no guarantee 
of pregnancy.47  A doctor at the university facility, believing the acts of placing eggs and sperm 
                                                          
45 Id. at 160. 
46 Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital in New York, No. 74 Civ. 3588 (CES), 1978 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14450 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).   
47 Robin Marantz Henig, ‘Pandora’s Baby,’ THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (Mar. 28, 2004), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/28/books/chapters/pandoras-baby.html?_r=1. 
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in a vial to create a human being was unethical, removed the stopper from the vial, and, thus, 
destroyed the “experiment.”48  The same week the case was tried, the first test tube baby was 
born in England.49   
At trial, the mother received a $50,000.00 verdict for emotional distress for her claim of 
physical and emotional damages and the father received $3.00 for loss of consortium after the 
destruction of their fertilized egg.50  At trial the jury rejected a property claim for the parents’ 
interest in the embryo.51  
 This case is an example of showing destruction of life, even before it was placed in the 
womb, was recognized to have caused damage to a mother, and would not be the type of damage 
that would be expected had mere cells or tissue been destroyed.  Loss of the created life, without 
even guarantee of birth, can profoundly affect the parent when that life is taken away. 
B. IN VIRGINIA, AN IVF CLINIC WANTED TO KEEP CONTROL OF THE 
EMBRYOS, BUT THE COURT FOUND PROGENITOR RIGHTS PREVAILED 
OVER CLINIC RIGHTS IN YORK v. JONES.  
       The next reported case on who had rights to stored embryos, analyzed whether the clinic, 
the Jones Institute, or the parents, York, had rights to the created “human pre-zygotes” that had 
been created and stored at the Jones Institute pursuant to a cryopreservation agreement drafted by 
the clinic.52  The agreement explained that cryopreserving the embryos would reduce the risk of 
multiple births while “creating additional opportunities for initiation of a pregnancy with the 
                                                          
48 Robin Marantz Henig, The Lives They Lived; Second Best, THE NEW YORK TIMES 
MAGAZINE (Dec. 28, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/28/magazine/the-lives-they-
lived-second-best.html.  
49 Id.  
50 Del Zio, supra note 46. See also Stuart Lavietes, Dr. L. B. Shettles, 93, Pioneer in Human 
Fertility, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (Feb. 16, 2003), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/16/nyregion/dr-l-b-shettles-93-pioneer-in-human-
fertility.html. 
51 Del Zio, supra note 46. 
52 York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).   
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transfer of concepti developed from thawed, frozen, pre-zygotes.”53  The fact the embryos were 
labeled “human pre-zygotes” implies that the embryos were at a one cell developmental stage 
before the maternal and paternal pro-nuclei moved to the center of the cell, and the chromosomes 
had lined up at the center of the cell.  The issue of whether the embryos were person or property 
was not challenged and the agreement indicated in a divorce proceeding ownership would be 
determined in a property settlement and released by court order.54  The court noted the agreement 
was consistent with the American Fertility Society (AFS) in their ethical statement on in-vitro 
fertilization, claiming gametes and concepti are property of the donors.55 
The progenitors/parents wanted the embryos shipped in a dry freezer to an out of state 
clinic, where the parents planned to have the embryos undergo implantation at a later date.56  The 
court examined the clinic consent form and noted while it gave the parents decision-making 
authority over the embryos, the form did not address whether the embryos could be taken from 
the clinic.  Since the form did not address that issue, then the parties were not limited by the 
three options that they were to implement in the event they did not seek to have the embryos 
transferred in hopes of a pregnancy initiated at the Jones Institute.57  The court held that the 
clinic was essentially holding the embryos as a bailment and favored progenitor rights over clinic 
rights and clinic forms, albeit by a property contract analysis based on a breach of contract claim 
filed by the progenitors.58 
                                                          
53 Id. at 424. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. Note later the AFS would change their position from referring the embryo as property to an 
entity deserving “special respect” more than any other human tissue, citing n. 53 Fertility and 
Sterility at 34S-35S (1990), referenced in Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596-97. 
56 York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. at 424. 
57 Id. at 427. 
58 Id. 
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This case is an example of wanting to promote a preference for parents and not clinics to 
have the ultimate authority over the life they have created.  While this case failed to recognize or 
analyze the true nature of the embryo, it accepted the clinic definition of the embryo as property.  
Later case law precedent would uphold clinic forms allowing a clinic to control the embryos fate 
to prevail over parental rights. 
C. THE SEMINAL CASE OF DAVIS v. DAVIS EXAMINED THE SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE OF WHEN HUMAN LIFE BEGINS IN DICTA. AT THE 
TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT LEVEL, AFTER REJECTING THE TRIAL 
COURT FINDING THAT HUMAN EMBRYOS ARE HUMAN BEINGS, THE 
COURT RULED THAT IF THERE IS NO CONTRACT, THEN A RIGHT TO 
PROCREATE SHOULD BE BALANCED AGAINST A RIGHT NOT TO 
PROCREATE, IN RESOLVING DISPUTES ON THE DISPOSITION OF 
STORED EMBRYOS, REFERENCING A LAW REVIEW ARTICLE BY JOHN 
A. ROBERTSON, WHICH ARGUED THAT THE EMBRYO WAS 
UNDIFFERENTIATED CELLS THAT WOULD FIRST BECOME PLACENTA 
AND CORD. 
  
Only one embryo custody dispute has been decided in which the trial court took evidence on 
the issue of whether a human embryo is a human being and deserving of legal protection.59  The 
trial court in Davis found that, on the evidence considered, the human embryos before it were 
indeed human beings.60  The appellate court reversed, and the Tennessee Supreme Court decided 
that the embryos occupied an intermediate status between person and property.61  But, its 
decision was made without the benefit of any advocacy for the embryos' status as human beings, 
as, by that time, the parties had abandoned any argument that the embryos were human beings.62 
Therefore, the issue of the embryos' status as human beings was not properly before the Court 
and its opinion regarding the embryo’s legal status was dicta.  This legal precedent needs to be 
                                                          
59 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597, n.10-11 cert. den.  Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911 (1993). 
60 Id. at 589. 
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 588. 
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reconsidered in light of current scientific research, which, ironically, fully supports the expert 
testimony offered in the trial court for the humanity of the human embryo. 
   The Tennessee Supreme Court in dicta claimed a “pre-embryo. . . is due greater respect 
than any other human tissue [emphasis added] because of its potential to become a person and 
because of its symbolic meaning for many people.”63  Nevertheless, “it should not be treated as a 
person, because it has not yet developed the features of personhood, is not yet established 
developmentally as individual, and may never realize its biologic potential.”64  
 In so doing, the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted the rationale of the American Fertility 
Society in 1990 and granted a legal status of “special respect” for a human embryo in Tennessee 
and did not recognize the human embryo as an already created being.65  The Tennessee Supreme 
Court opined that the special respect status left the decision-making power as to the embryos’ 
fate with the progenitors, but if they could not agree then the constitutional rights of the parties to 
procreate or not procreate had to be balanced.66  
This lack of recognition that the human embryos were already biologically created human 
organisms has led to an erroneous precedent that embryos fate can be decided by contracts 
drafted by corporations and a claim that there is a right to procreate to be balanced against the 
right not to procreate, when the scientific fact is that human embryos are human beings and have 
already been procreated.  In effect, what is balanced under this approach is a parent’s right to 
terminate innocent unborn life living in a facility and not in a human womb, because the parent 
wants to escape the duties and responsibilities of parenthood for the created life, versus the 
                                                          
63 Id. at 596. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 603. 
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parent’s right to provide for the care for the innocent unborn life of their son or daughter to grow 
and develop and to complete the cycle of life.67  A re-examination of the misconceived science 
understood in 1990 by the Tennessee Supreme Court is warranted, as the misconception that 
stored embryos are mere cells or tissue still exists.68 
 In rejecting Dr. LeJuene’s testimony that the embryo was a human being, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court in Davis69 gave more weight to the testimony of Dr. Robertson, who served on 
the American Fertility Society, Dr. King, who was the parents’ IVF physician, and the post-trial 
American Fertility Society 1990s statement describing an embryo’s first cellular differentiation 
relating to interaction with the mother at the time of implantation.70  The analysis was really 
dicta, because, not only was there no advocacy in the briefs on personhood at the Tennessee 
Supreme Court, it was dicta because the Court commented  that the distinction was not 
dispositive of the issues before it, but relevant as to whether research was permitted on the 
embryo.71 
 The Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion referenced Robertson’s article,72 which was 
written subsequent to the trial court decision in Davis, and stated that “[c]learly the fertilized 
egg, embryo and fetus are human and are living.”73  Robertson claimed the question is whether 
embryos merit the moral protection accorded to clearly defined persons.74  Robertson believed 
                                                          
67 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
68  McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, n.4 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); (referring to “pre-embryos 
as human tissue and genetic material and claiming the embryo proper or the actual embryo did 
not exist until implantation). 
69 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 593-94. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at n.15.  
72 John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437 
(1990). See also Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. 
73 Robertson, supra note 72, at 444, n.24. 
74 Id. 
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there was a problem in determining the legal status of embryos in reconciling respect for human 
life and personhood with competing concerns of bodily integrity and procreative choice.75 
Robertson suggested when there was no agreement to govern the embryos fate that “[a]s long as 
the party wishing to reproduce could create other embryos, the desire to avoid biologic offspring 
should take priority over the desire to reproduce with the embryos in question.”76  This logic did 
not recognize that reproduction already has occurred and lacked respect for the dignity of the 
created human being. 
Current reported scientific factual observations do not support Robertson’s 1990 claim in 
the law review relied on by the Tennessee Supreme Court, that the embryo was not a created 
being, and Robertson’s criticism that the trial judge in Davis ignored “the biological reality that 
the early embryos, while genetically unique, consist of a few undifferentiated cells that will first 
form the placenta before the embryo itself develops.”77  Robertson in 1990 did not acknowledge 
each stored embryo had the body part plan and components that were already developing in an 
orderly and temporal sequence in accord with the instructions written in the DNA of each human 
embryo, and each was developing uniquely from the other stored embryos in accordance with his 
or her own DNA instructions. Robertson recommended “that the party wishing to avoid 
reproduction should prevail whenever the other party has a reasonable chance of becoming a 
                                                          
75 Id. at 437.  
76 Id. at 480. 
77  Id. at 482-83. See also Lori Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryos, 32 LOYOLA L. REV. 
357, 363-64 (1986). Andrews claimed “[m]oreover since embryos are undifferentiated cell 
masses [emphasis added by the author] and do not resemble people, it is unlikely that actions 
toward in vitro embryos will shape our actions towards new born children, comatose people, 
elderly patients or other persons.” Andrews also reported that John Robertson’s viewpoint of a 
human embryo was “a biological program that instructs a woman’s body.” Id. at n.2. The Davis 
case also referenced Andrews, in a discussion about resolution along with other disposition 
models in legal journals at the time. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at n.5. 
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parent by other means.”78  The Tennessee Supreme Court's decision essentially adopted 
Robertson's description of “biological reality” and his recommendation of a presumption in favor 
of a parental decision to terminate what he believed were “undifferentiated cells that will first 
form the placenta,” not recognizing that the cells were live human organisms with potential to 
complete their life cycle.79  In 1990, Robertson did not acknowledge that the role of the gamete 
providers was biologically completed in contributing to the makeup of the new created organism, 
and the new human organism was viable when stored and would remain viable until death, so the 
procreation was complete. The continued growth and development of the embryo would depend 
on shelter in a womb prenatally and nourishment, just as all humans need appropriate shelter and 
nourishment even during mature age, just as an astronaut in space or a serviceman in a 
submarine.80  
As discussed, Robertson’s and others description of early embryos as “consist[ing] of a 
few undifferentiated cells,” is scientifically incorrect as the embryo is acting as a human 
organism.  Current scientific observations prove the opposite.  Every cell in the embryo can have 
different behaviors working towards revealing different parts of the body plan as the human 
organism grows and develops.81   
The Davis court's chief rationale and basis of the court opinion for denying the humanity 
of the early embryo was the alleged “undifferentiated” nature in that the opinion stated: 
Thus the first cellular differentiation of the new generation relates to the 
                                                          
78 Robertson, supra note 72, at 476. See also John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for 
Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 407, 409, 480, n.107.  
79 Robertson, supra note 72, at 482.  
80 Kelly J. Hollowell, Defining a Person Under the Fourteenth Amendment: A Constitutionally 
and Scientifically Based Analysis, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 67, 85 (2001), 
http://www.regent.edu/acad/schlaw/student_life/studentorgs/lawreview/docs/issues/v14n1/Vol.%
2014,%20No.%201,%203%20Hollowell.pdf. 
81 Condic, supra note 24, at 58. See also Edwards, supra note 17, at 207.  
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physiological interaction with the mother, rather than to the establishment of the 
embryo itself. It is for this reason that it is appropriate to refer to the developing 
entity up to this point as a preembryo rather than an embryo…82 
 
Since the basis of denying the embryos humanity was based on the premise that the cells in the 
embryo were not differentiating and the body parts of the embryo were not developing prior to 
implantation in a womb, and that premise is contradicted by current scientific observation,83 the 
courts should no longer accept or rely on Davis or its progeny to privilege a parent's desire to 
terminate embryonic life over the opposing parent's desire to preserve it, or for denying an 
embryo's rights as a full human being.84  Robertson’s lack of understanding in 1990 of what a 
                                                          
82 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594; (citing the June 1990 American Fertility Society report on Ethical 
Considerations in the New Technologies). 
83 Hollowell, supra note 80, at 90-92; (discussing how cloning is proof the development of the 
embryo is separate from the mother who provides a nurturing environment).  
84 The school of thought of not giving a “moral” status of personhood to a human organism 
because “it has not yet developed the features of personhood, it is not yet established as 
developmental individual, and it may never reach its biological potential” was the position of the 
American Fertility Society in 1990, even though it had members that did not accept this school 
of thought. Fertility and Sterility, Chapter 19: Status of the Conceptus, 81 AM. FERTILITY SOC’Y 
47 (May 2004), https://www.fertstert.org/article/S0015-0282(04)00294-8/pdf?code=fns-site. The 
report highlighted that the moral and legal status of the “developing human conceptus” was key 
to accepting many procedures such as selection for transfer and discard of embryos with or 
without preimplantation genetic diagnosis, experimentation, surrogacy and cryopreservation. The 
report also stated: 
Not the least of the problem is that the moral and legal status may differ from each 
other in the minds of some individuals.  For example, in the United States, 
according to the Supreme Court decision of Roe v. Wade, personhood (i.e., 
protection by society) begins only with viability, but considerable (emphasis added 
by author) opinion holds that pre-embryos should not be used for experimentation 
because they are persons, or at least they require the respect of an individual who 
is in being (i.e., a human being). Id.  
Further, it reported that from the conducted survey, it did not intend the moral status to be related 
to research, but the replies to the survey must be evaluated with that connection. Further, “[i]t 
needs to be noted that the time limit for experimentation may or may not correspond to the 
acquisition for personhood.” Id. Also, “[a]bout one half of the respondents indicated in their 
reply to the questionnaire that personhood was considered to begin with fertilization.” Id.  In 
addition, “it was difficult to know whether the survey respondents were stating religious tradition 
or legislative position.” Id.  
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human organism is and how cells in the early embryo are communicating and directing the 
behavior of the progeny cells to reveal all the cells in the body plan until they cease to exist 
prenatally or postnatally, has been a basis for embryos to be treated as cells or tissues and 
therefore, property subjects in dispute, instead of the frank presentation to decision makers, such 
as courts, that in-vitro embryos like in-vivo embryos are created human beings, not mere 
reproductive tissue, and human beings are the subjects  at issue in embryo fate disputes. 
 When balancing party rights, Robertson acknowledges that the pleasures of parenthood 
will be deeper and more intense than the discomfort of unwanted biological offspring, but 
Robertson would only grant this pleasure to the parent that cannot “reproduce.”85  The problem 
in the Robertson proposed balancing test of the right to procreate or not procreate or reproduce or 
not reproduce, is that it fails to recognize that procreation has occurred and fails to afford the 
dignity and respect due to protect the human rights of the already created human beings, with 
DNA different from progenitor and sibling embryos. 
                                                          
Similarly, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) recognizes diversity 
in its membership on whether an embryo has a “moral” status of a person. Ethics Committee of 
the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Donating embryos for human embryonic stem 
cell (Hesc) research: A Committee Opinion, 100 FERTILITY & STERILITY 935 (2013), 
https://www.asrm.org/news-and-publications/ethics-committee-documents/. ASRM recognized 
diversity in viewpoints among its members and reported 
…the embryo used in research, which ranges in development from a single cell to 
hundreds cells has no nervous system and has a limited chance of developing to 
birth.  The possibility of twinning or regression to a nonviable entity up to the 14th 
day after fertilization is consistent with the notion that the embryo lacks 
individuality. Id.  
The ASRM Ethics Committee regards the embryo as a “potential” human being worthy 
of “special respect.” Id.  Further, the committee claims, for good reason, the human embryo can 
be subject to experimental research before the primitive streak appears around day fourteen of 
development.  Note that these international and national professional societies statement 
published a “moral” value, that not all of their own members share, and is not a reflection on the 
objective observable biologic fact that a human embryo is a developing human being. 
85 Robertson, supra note 72, at 481. 
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  The Robertson approach promotes a culture having an affirmative right to terminate 
innocent wanted human life hidden under the guise of a right not to procreate, while ignoring 
that procreation has already occurred.  According to Robertson, there is no loss of a right to 
procreate when any future children can be created, so if one weighs a right to procreate against a 
right not to procreate and one can still procreate, then the one opposing procreation always wins 
the balancing contest.86  
At the Davis trial, world-renowned human geneticist, Dr. Jerome LeJeune, in his expert 
testimony equated conception with fertilization, saying “[e]ach human has a unique beginning 
which occurs at the moment of conception.”87  He refuted the idea that there is a “subclass of the 
embryo to be called a preembryo,” stating “there is nothing before the embryo; before an embryo 
there is only a sperm and an egg . . .  . When the first cell exists all the ‘tricks of the trade’ to 
build itself into an individual already exists.”88  
The trial court found Dr. LeJeune's testimony to be clear and unrebutted, and concluded, 
                                                          
86 Id. at 480. 
87 Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *14 (Ct. App. Sep. 21, 1989).  
Dr. LeJeune’s use of “conception” for fertilization or sperm-egg fusion reflected its common 
meaning at the time. Dr. LeJeune did not mean “completion of implantation,” which is the 
definition of “conception.” Am. C. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Terminology Bulletin: 
Terms Used in Reference to the Fetus, NO. 1. PHILADELPHIA: DAVIS (Sept. 1965). The change in 
definition was made for other than scientific reasons.  See Richard Sosnowski, The Pursuit of 
Excellence: Have We Apprehended and Comprehended It? 150 AM. J. OF OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 115, 117 (1984) (citing “I do not deem it excellent to play semantic gymnastics in 
a profession … It is equally troublesome to me that, with no scientific evidence to validate the 
change, the definition of conception as the successful spermatic penetration of an ovum was 
redefined as the implantation of a fertilized ovum. It appears to me that the only reason for this 
was the dilemma produced by the possibility that the intrauterine device might function as an 
abortifacient.”). 
88 Davis, supra note 87, at *14-15. Dr. LeJeune testified that “upon fertilization, the entire 
constitution of the man [human male and human female] is clearly, unequivocally spelled-out, 
including arms, legs, nervous systems and the like; that upon inspection via DNA manipulation, 
one can see the life codes for each of these otherwise unobservable elements of the unique 
individual.” Id. at *27.  
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in agreement with Dr. LeJeune, “that the cells of human embryos are comprised of differentiated 
cells, unique in character and specialized to the highest degree of distinction.”89  Based on Dr. 
LeJeune’s testimony, the trial court concluded that the “life codes for each special, unique 
individual are resident at conception and animate the new person very soon after fertilization 
occurs.”90  As discussed above, scientific research conducted since Dr. LeJeune’s 1989 
testimony fully validates it.  Observable scientific facts reveal that an individual identifiable 
human life separate from the progenitors begins at fertilization. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s 1992 decision, however, rejected Dr. LeJeune’s 
testimony and embraced the opinions of the three other trial experts including Professor John 
Robertson.  Those opinions were based on statements of the Ethics Committee of the American 
Fertility Society (AFS) issued in 1986.91  Ironically, the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected Dr. 
LeJeune’s opinion, that no such thing as a pre-embryo exists, as unscientific, concluding that he 
exhibited “profound confusion between science and religion,”92 but then approvingly cited the 
AFS ethics statements in support of its own decision.93  
                                                          
89 Id.  
90 Id.  
91 The trial court noted that the three experts opposing Dr. LeJeune “rely at least to some degree 
on the report of the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society in forming the basis of 
their opinions.” Id. at *16. Dr. Charles Alex Shivers testified that “[a]t the time of fertilization, 
genetic controls are ‘locked in forever’ and control who the pre-embryo will later be, but ‘. . . as 
far as we know . . . to my knowledge. . . there is no way to distinguish the cells; that they are 
undifferentiated . . . .” Id. at *14. Professor Robertson also testified in the Davis trial that “[a] 
human embryo is an entity composed of a group of undifferentiated cells which have no organs 
or nervous system.  That at about 10-14 days, the pre-embryo attaches itself to the uterine wall, 
develops its primitive streak and life then commences.” Id.  Dr. King, the treating IVF physician, 
testified that at about 14 days the group of embryonic cells begins to differentiate in a process 
that permits the eventual development of the different body parts which will become an 
individual. Id. at *13. 
92 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 593. 
93 The Tennessee Supreme Court quoted from “The [AF] Society’s June 1990 report on Ethical 
Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies,” published in the official Journal of the 
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Each of the bases cited by the Tennessee Supreme Court in support of its ruling -- that 
there is something called a “pre-embryo” that is not a human being but an “entity deserving 
special respect” from days one to fourteen, and an “embryo” only at day fourteen and thereafter94 
-- is demonstrably wrong in view of subsequent research regarding human embryonic 
development (as discussed supra and infra).  
The very term “pre-embryo” has been discredited.  The International Federation of 
Associations of Anatomists, which is charged with defining phases of human embryonic 
development to appear in embryology textbooks, recommends against any scientific use of the 
term.95  Embryologists confirm that it is scientifically inaccurate and ill-defined.96  That is not 
                                                          
American Fertility Society. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. at 593-94, 596, n.14. Davis references Chapter 8, 
“The biologic characteristics of the preembryo.” Id. at 593-594, 31S-33S. Davis also references 
Chapter 9, “The moral and legal status of the pre-embryo.” Id. at 596, 34S-36S. These reports are 
a later edition of the AFS Ethics Statements quoted by the Davis trial court titled “Ethical 
Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies,” which appeared as in the Journal of the 
American Fertility Society. Id. at 593. Of significance today the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) has a position statement against “personhood” of the embryo, 
making allegations about the impact of recognizing the embryo as a person on the practice 
medicine and instead describes the embryo as mere “fertilized reproductive tissues.” ASRM 
Position Statement on Personhood Measures, AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED.  
https://www.asrm.org/ASRM_Position_Statement_on_Personhood_Measures/. 
94 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 593-94, 596-97. 
95 See TE PrePublication, UNIFR at 10, n.32 (Apr. 21, 2010), 
http://www.unifr.ch/ifaa/Public/EntryPage/ViewTE/TEe02.html; (“The foreshortened term 'pre-
embryo', which has been used in legal and clinical contexts, is not recommended.”). 
96 O’Rahilly, supra note 1, at 88. O’Rahilly explained why he did not use the term “pre-embryo” 
in his medical textbook:  
The term “pre-embryo” is not used here for the following reasons: (1) it is ill-defined 
because it is said to end with the appearance of the primitive streak or to include 
neurulation; (2) it is inaccurate because purely embryonic cells can already be 
distinguished after a few days, as can also the embryonic (not pre-embryonic!) disc; (3) it 
is unjustified because the accepted meaning of the word embryo includes all of the first 8 
weeks; (4) it is equivocal because it may convey the erroneous idea that a new human 
organism is formed at only some considerable time after fertilization; and (5) it was 
introduced in 1986 ‘largely for public policy reasons’ (Biggers). … Just as postnatal age 
begins at birth, prenatal age begins at fertilization. Id. 
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surprising since, as noted by the trial court, the term “pre-embryo” was created by the IVF 
industry itself to assist IVF practitioners defend themselves in malpractice suits.97 
Subsequent scientific research refutes the distinction between embryo and pre-embryo.  
Scientific factual observations of human embryo development reveal that far from being a 
“multicellular aggregate of undifferentiated cells” until fourteen days after fertilization, a human 
zygote “from the moment of sperm-egg fusion onward” exhibits “globally coordinated functions 
that promote the health and survival of the individual as a whole.”98 
The Court’s statement that “the first cellular differentiation of the new generation relates 
to physiologic interaction with the mother, rather than to the establishment of the embryo itself,” 
                                                          
See also Ferrer Colomer et al., The Preembryo’s Short Lifetime. The History of a Word., 23 
CUADERNOS DE BIOÉTICA 677, 678 (2013), 
http://www.redalyc.org/html/875/87525473007/index.html. The term “preembryo” is rarely used 
today in scientific and bioethical literature.  
97 Davis, supra note 87, at *20. 
98 Condic, supra note 24, at 48. See also Renee Reijo Pera, Earlier, more accurate prediction of 
embryo survival enabled by research, STAN. NEWS CTR. (Oct. 3, 2010), 
http://med.stanford.edu/news/all-news/2010/10/earlier-more-accurate-prediction-of-embryo-
survival-enabled-by-research.html. (Dr. Pera emphasized that early embryos are not 
undifferentiated cell aggregates.  She reported that she and her colleagues learned from filming 
242 human zygotes developing that some cells in the eight-cell embryos express genes specific 
to further development of the embryonic body, and other cells express mostly maternal genes. 
She indicates that “[w]e've always thought of embryos as living or dying [as a whole], but in 
reality we find each cell is making decisions autonomously.” Thus, the cells exhibit 
differentiated behavior).  See also Connie C. Wong et al., Non-invasive imaging of human 
embryos before embryonic genome activation predicts development to the blastocyst stage,  28 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1115, 1119-20, fig.6 (2010); Renee Reijo Pera et al., Non-invasive 
imaging of human embryos before embryonic genome activation predicts development to the 
blastocyst stage, EXCEMED (2013), https://www.excemed.org/resources/l3-non-invasive-
imaging-human-embryos-embryonic-genome-activation-predicts-development-blastocyst-stage. 
(Dr. Pera noted that not all cells within the human embryo divide in synchrony, but on a self-
determined schedule. Prior to her 2008 research, she and other scientists believed that all cells of 
an eight-cell embryo acted as a colony, rather than each cell enacting its own program, which is 
what actually happens.  She said she was surprised to learn that, in fact, each cell enacts its own 
program, which  confirms that early embryo cells perform different tasks yet work in an 
integrated, coordinated, organismic program to elaborate the body plan and supportive 
structures).   
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is also incorrect given the embryo acts as an organism.99  Scientific factual observation reveals 
the cells in the early embryo work together to develop the embryo body together with the 
placenta and cord cells.100  The inner cell mass that will make the cells of the embryo/human 
body are believed to be present in two of the first four cells.101  The Davis Court also mistakenly 
discounted the individuality of the “preembryo” prior to fourteen days of development, 
referencing the AFS report.102  
The Davis Court also relied on an AFS assertion that, at the eighth cell stage, the 
developmental singleness of one person has not been established.103  This AFS statement is 
outdated and incorrect.  It is now known that only cells in earlier stages, perhaps up to the four-
cell stage, may be totipotent (that is, "capable of generating a globally coordinated developmental 
sequence" necessary to constitute an organism).104   
Also, even assuming that a four-cell embryo possesses four totipotent cells, the embryo is 
not thereby comprised of four human beings.  The four cells work in concert toward development 
unless and until disaggregated.  If a four-cell embryo is scientifically manipulated to be taken 
apart cell by cell to develop four separate embryos; or a six to eight cell embryo is split into two 
three to four cells embryos to make two embryos, then the disaggregated cells need another 
                                                          
99 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594. (The Supreme Court cited Robertson’s law review article which 
criticized the Davis trial court for ignoring “the biological reality that the early embryos, while 
genetically unique, consist of a few undifferentiated cells that will first form the placenta before 
the embryo itself develops.”). Robertson, supra note 72, at 482. 
100 Edwards Robert and Christoph Hansis, Initial Differentiation of blastomeres in 4-cell human 
embryos and its significance for early embryogenesis and implantation, 11 REPROD. 
BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 206, 206-18 (2005). (The author, Robert Edwards won the Nobel Prize for 
helping create the first test tube baby in 1978).  
101 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594.  
102 Id. at 596. 
103 Id. at 593.  
104 Maureen L. Condic, Totipotency: What It Is and What It Isn’t, 23 STEM CELLS & DEV. 796, 
797, fig. 1 (2013), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3991987/.  
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empty zona pellucida105 (the transparent more or less elastic noncellular outer layer or 
envelope of a mammalian ovum that is composed of glycoproteins)106 to be placed in, in 
order for the disaggregated cells to grow as a human organism. The fact cells within an 
organism can be artificially manipulated to become duplicate does not diminish the 
human value of the developing organism or mean a human being is not in development.  
Dr. Condic states: “Embryos repair injury. They adapt to changing environmental 
conditions. Most importantly, they show coordinated interactions between parts (molecules, 
cells, tissues, structures, and organs) that promote the survival, health, and continued 
development of the organism as a whole.”107  One human being is developing as the cells divide 
into more cells.  Thus, “[t]he significant role of 'community effects' in development . . . clearly 
illustrates that the behavior of cells in groups is distinct from the behavior of the individual cells 
comprising the group.”108   
Dr. Condic explains that when a human embryo at the blastocyst stage splits in half to 
produce a twin, the developmental process does not start again from a single cell.109  Instead, the 
different cells in each half of the embryo repair and regenerate themselves consistent with being 
a human organism.110  Therefore, the fact that the human organism has a body plan to generate 
identical (twin) siblings (or is capable of reproducing a twin) does not mean that an individual 
                                                          
105 Karl Illmensee et al., Human embryo twinning with applications in reproductive medicine, 93 
Fertility & Sterility 423 (2010), https://www.fertstert.org/article/S0015-0282%2808%2904795-
X/fulltext. 
106 Zona pellucida, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/zona%20pellucida (last accessed Oct. 16, 
2017). 
107 Id. at 800.  
108 Condic, supra note 104. 
109 Id. at 804-05, fig. 5.  
110 Id.  
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human being is not present both before and after reproducing.111 
The additional AFS claim, cited by Davis,112  that an embryo is not a human being 
because the embryo has not yet developed the “features of personhood,” ignores that all human 
beings are not actually at all alike because each enjoys a unique genome, the internal 
development blueprint that produced a unique human being, with an identity that is different 
from other embryos.  Cells in the early embryo are not featureless at all from the point of view 
that really matters in human development: genes. The AFS (and the Davis Supreme Court in 
reliance on the AFS) could ignore or discount such scientific knowledge in the 1990’s.  Courts 
may not do so today after the human genome has been mapped and its determinative influence 
on human life from the moment of fertilization is well recognized.113 
                                                          
111 The AFS's related argument, that the “singleness” of a person is not established because each 
cell in the early embryo has the "totipotent" ability to independently develop into a complete 
adult, is meritless. (Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 593, citing AFS at 31S).  Even assuming an eight-cell 
embryo has eight totipotent cells, the embryo does not thereby comprise eight human beings.  
One human being is developing.  If one totipotent cell is manually extracted from the embryo at 
this time (not a normal event in embryonic development), the cell can rebuild, given a nutritive 
culture, and the remaining cells in the embryo from which the cell was extracted may regenerate 
the missing cell.  But this behavior confirms that the extracted cell and the remaining intact cells 
each continue to behave as organisms after the cell is extracted.  It does not in any way suggest 
that the embryo was somehow not a “single” organism before the totipotent cell was extracted.  
It was a single organism, just as an embryo prior to twinning is a single organism. Condic, supra 
note 104, at 804.  
112 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596.  
113 See Helen Pearson, Your destiny, from day one, 418 NATURE PUBLISHING GROUP NEWS 
FEATURE 14, 15 (July 4, 2002), 
http://www.public.iastate.edu/~zool.433/Lectures/mammal.egg.assym.pdf. (She states the 
following:   
Your world was shaped in the first 24 hours after conception. Where your head and feet 
would sprout, and which side would form your back and which your belly, were being 
defined in the minutes and hours after sperm and egg united.  
 
Just five years ago, this statement would have been heresy. Mammalian embryos were 
thought to spend their first few days as a featureless orb of cells. Only later, at about the 
time of implantation into the wall of the uterus, were cells thought to acquire distinct 
‘fates’ determining their positions in the future body. But by tagging specific points on 
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Similarly, the AFS worry that an embryo is not a real human being because the embryo 
may die before reaching its potential,114 is no valid ground for denying human being status to an 
embryo.115  The same point can be made of any moment in a human being’s life trajectory.  Life 
issues no guarantee of continuity to anyone. Lady Justice wears a blindfold and would not 
speculate on the vulnerability of the human being invoking the courts protection to secure the 
unalienable right to life through a parent willing to take responsibility to care and nurture his or 
her offspring. 
In short, none of the reasons cited by the Davis court is scientifically correct in light of 
current scientific research.  While an early human embryo can be empirically observed in various 
recognized stages of development (ootid, zygote, embryo, fetus, baby, child, adolescent, adult, 
elder, etc.), “pre-embryo” is not one of these stages because a human organism is a whole human 
being in each developmental stage.116  
Unfortunately, all subsequent case precedent has relied in whole or in part on Davis's 
                                                          
mammalian eggs shortly after fertilization, researchers have now shown that they come to 
lie at predictable points in the embryo. Rather than being a naive sphere, it seems that a 
newly fertilized egg has a defined top–bottom axis that sets up the equivalent axis in the 
future embryo. . . . 
 
What is clear is that developmental biologists will no longer dismiss early mammalian 
embryos as featureless bundles of cells.) Id.  
114 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596.  
115 Pera, supra note 98. (Stanford News and Medicine reported that thirty-eight percent of the 
embryos in its study reached the blastocyst stage and a blastocyst is usually an indication of a 
healthy embryo).  
116 The Davis Supreme Court worried that if the trial court ruling were affirmed, human embryos 
would be persons and have “legally cognizable interests different from those of their progenitors. 
Such a decision would doubtless have had the effect of outlawing IVF programs in the state of 
Tennessee.” 842 S.W.2d at 595. The extreme effect envisioned by the Supreme Court in Davis is 
not a necessary outcome of recognizing the full humanity of a human embryo, as demonstrated 
in Louisiana where an embryo is recognized as a judicial person under the law, (LA-RS §124, 
LA-RS 9 §128), yet IVF has not been outlawed. 
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scientifically invalid analysis classifying embryos as deserving respect more than any other 
human tissue, rather than acknowledging, as the Patent Office does, that human embryos are 
human organisms.117  
  No later court has undertaken a re-analysis of the parties’ rights and interests regarding 
the subject matter at issue, the embryos’ fate, based on correctly identifying the nature of the 
human embryos as a human beings and human offspring who are existing with full potential to 
complete life’s cycle and identifiable DNA distinct from the parties/ progenitors/parents who 
want the court to resolve their dispute over the embryos fate.  These cases do not provide cogent 
or authoritative precedent for a decision based upon current scientific knowledge that would 
permit the rights and interests of all parties concerning the embryos at issue to be correctly 
identified and weighed on the scales of justice. 
D. KASS v. KASS, DID NOT CHALLENGE THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE 
EMBRYOS AS NONPERSONS UNDER FEDERAL AND NEW YORK LAW,  
NOR THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN EMBRYOS AS DESCRIBED IN DAVIS, 
BUT TREATED THE EMBRYOS AS UNDIFFERENTIATED CELLULAR 
PROPERTY OF MOTHER AND FATHER THAT COULD BE OWNED BY A 
CLINIC PURSUSANT TO CONTRACT, CONTRARY TO  THE TRIAL COURT 
FINDING THAT STORED EMBRYOS WERE PROCREATED POTENTIAL 
LIFE WITH FATE TO BE DETERMINED BY THE MOTHER, AND THE 
RIGHTS INVOLVED WERE MORE PRECIOUS THAN PROPERTY RIGHTS. 
 
After the Davis case, the trial court in Kass v. Kass was the next court to address a 
parental dispute regarding the fate of stored embryos.118 At both the trial and appellate levels, the 
courts treated the nature of the parents’ interest in their cryopreserved offspring as a property 
interest, even though in the Davis decision the embryos were deemed neither person nor 
                                                          
117 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of September 16, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29.  
118 Kass v. Kass, No. 19658/93, 1995 WL 110368, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995), rev'd, 235 
A.D.2d 150, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1997), aff'd, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 696 N.E.2d 174 (1998).  
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property.119  The Kass offspring were at an earlier stage of development than the four to eight 
cell embryos described in the Davis case, and the offspring were defined as “pre-zygotes,” as 
were the embryos in the York case.120 
             At the trial stage, the Kass case raised the questions as to when procreation occurs and 
what rights a person not bearing the created life has to request termination of even a “potential 
life.”121  The trial court saw the embryos as procreated potential life whose fate depended on the 
mother’s choice, and thought the rights at issue were far more precious than property rights, 
noting it was absurd to equate zygotes with property like washing machines and jewelry.122  In 
contrast, the highest court of New York in describing the development of the early embryos, 
paints a picture of the stored embryos as undifferentiated cells in quoting the description by the 
Davis court.123  The appellate courts emphasized deciding the embryos fate based on the 
contractual rights of the parties as the appropriate remedy, when disputes arise as to the fate of 
stored embryos.124 
 In Kass, the IVF clinic document claimed that “pre-zygotes” were subject to a property 
settlement if the parties divorced.125  A “pre-zygote” was defined as eggs penetrated by sperm 
which have not yet joined genetic material.126  When IVF services were first provided, some 
providers believed a new human life was not yet created if the fertilized egg was cryopreserved 
before the pronuclei of the egg and sperm membranes broke down and the chromosomes lined 
                                                          
119 Id. at *2. 
120 Id. at *4. 
121 Id. at *3. 
122 Id. at *2 
123 Id. 
124 Id.  
125 Id. at *4. 
126 Kass, 91 N.Y.2d at 557.  
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up at the cell’s center to form a cleavage spindle, allowing the cell to split into two cells with 
identical chromosomes.127 
The Kass trial court did not have a trial with experts to address the nature of “pre-
zygotes.”128  The trial court defined a zygote as a cell formed by the union of two reproductive 
cells or gametes.129  The court claimed that the term most commonly used following creation is 
pre-embryo (no citation provided by court) and the court would use both terms 
interchangeably.130  The Kass trial court thought a key to an intelligent discussion was if the 
product of an in vitro fertilization had a conceptual or propositional difference from the product 
of an in vivo fertilization.131  
The trial court commented that: 
Fertilization is fertilization and fertilization of the ovum is the inception of the 
reproductive process. Biological life exists from that moment forward, the fact 
that an in vitro zygote does not seek to fulfill its biological destiny immediately 
upon such fertilization does not alter that fact.  The rights of the parties are 
dependent on the nature of the zygote not the stage of its development or 
locations.132  
  
          Unlike the Davis Tennessee Supreme Court, the Kass trial court reasoned that a right not 
to procreate was waived for a husband after coital reproduction and it would be waived and non-
existent after participation in an in vitro program.133 The court noted that to transform a right not 
to procreate founded in restraint to a right to take positive steps to terminate a potential human 
                                                          
127 Condic, supra note 24, at 68; (explaining how Germany allows research experimentation on 
“pre-zygotes” but not “embryos.”). 
128 Kass, supra note 118, at *1. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at *3.  
132 Id. at *2. 
133 Id. 
 33 
 
life, was a right the Supreme Court of the United States expressly refused to recognize.134  
          The Kass trial court then examined the conduct of the wife and the clinic informed consent 
form to determine if the parties’ constitutional rights were waived.135  The trial court found 
express terms “[i]n the event of divorce, we understand that legal ownership of any pre-zygotes 
must be determined in a property settlement and will be released as directed by order of a Court 
of competent jurisdiction”  meant the clinic agreement regarding the embryos distribution would 
be subject to directives of the divorce court.136  An addendum to the consent form indicated that 
if the husband and wife did not want to initiate a pregnancy and were “unable to make a 
decision” about what to do, then they would let the “pre-zygotes” be disposed of by the IVF 
Program for approved research investigation.137  The trial court reasoned that terms in the 
Addendum were contingent upon neither party being able to determine the disposition, and did 
not think there was any rule of construction that would apply the addendum in the clinic contract 
to a divorce situation.138  
 Later, the appellate court rejected the trial ruling that the mother alone had the power to 
decide the fate of the zygote and ruled that a woman’s right to privacy and bodily integrity like 
the one in Roe v. Wade are not implicated before implantation occurs.139  The appeals court 
unanimously believed that when the parties in the custody dispute had an agreement about the 
disposition of unused fertilized eggs the agreement should control.140  
           The highest court in New York treated the embryos as property and held that the clinic 
                                                          
134 Id. at *3; (citing Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)).  
135 Id. at *4. 
136 Id. at *3. 
137 Id. at *4. 
138 Id. 
139 Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 586.  
140 Id. at 587. 
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contract that allowed for the clinic to use the “pre-zygotes” for approved research investigation if 
the parties were unable to come to a decision was valid, and therefore the clinic was awarded the 
embryos.  This implies that the New York highest court did not consider the embryos as human 
beings, but considered the embryos as cellular or tissue property, in allowing an institution, the 
clinic, to receive the embryos for research. While the trial court had considered the Kass 
offspring potential life, and found pursuant to Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth,  
there was no right to terminate potential human life by a person who was not carrying the 
offspring, the recognition of the right of a parent to protect offspring was not discussed in Kass 
by the highest New York Court reviewing the trial court decision.141 
The highest court in Kass v. Kass accepted and relied on the factual statements about how 
cells differentiate from the Davis case, in that the court stated: 
Once a sperm cell fertilizes the egg, this fusion –or pre-zygote-divides until it 
reaches the four- to eight-cell stage, after which several pre-zygotes are transferred 
to the woman’s uterus by a cervical catheter.  If the procedure succeeds, an embryo 
will attach itself to the uterine wall, differentiate and develop into a fetus…. 142  
 
 This above statement by the Kass court illustrates the State Court of New York’s 
scientific terminology confusion and misunderstanding as to the factual nature and development 
of a fertilized ovum or offspring created.  First, according to embryologists that rely on the 
Carnegie Stages terminology to describe human embryonic development, there is no “prezygote” 
after a human organism has chromosomes lined up at the cleavage spindle and has further 
divided into two cells within the embryo.143  Second, a zygote is a one cell embryo, as described 
in most scientific literature and a zygote does not have multiple cells, nor does a “pre-zygote” 
                                                          
141 Kass, supra note 118, at *3. 
142 Kass, 91 N.Y.2d at 557. 
143 O’Rahilly, supra note 1, at 89. 
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have multiple cells but is a term to describe the zygote at a stage of development prior to the 
chromosomes lining up at the cleavage spindle in the zygote cell before division.144  Third, a one 
cell zygote behaves as a human organism from the moment of sperm and egg binding.145  Fourth, 
cell differentiation among cells within the embryo is observed in the early embryo prior to 
implantation.146  
The wrong assumption about the biological status of the pre-zygote led to the decision in 
Kass, which favored a property contractual remedy for the fate of the “pre-zygotes.”147  Yet, the 
Kass court denied it needed to determine the legal status of the embryos.148  Rather than 
scientifically viewing the facts about the nature of the embryo, the Kass court found the embryos 
were not persons under constitutional law.149  Thus, having determined for constitutional 
purposes the “pre-zygotes” were not persons, the Kass court opined the next step in the test was 
who had the decision-making authority.150  The highest court held the “parties’ agreement” had 
the authority and it did not have to determine the legal status of the embryos or balance the rights 
of the parties as the Davis court did.151  
 Note: a clinic drafted consent form for the embryos fate that was agreed upon was 
upheld, despite the fact that a parent wanted to protect their offspring and a lower court did not 
find the agreed clinic contract allowing the clinic to own the embryos, when the progenitors were 
undecided about what to do, should apply when progenitors divorce and had disagreement about 
                                                          
144 Condic, supra note 24, at 44, 56-60. 
145 Id. at 47-48. 
146 Edwards & Hansis, supra note 17.  
147 Kass, supra note 118, at *2. 
148 Id.  
149 Id. (Citing Roe v. Wadeand Bryn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 410 U.S. 949 
(1972). 
150 Kass, 91 N.Y.2d at 561. 
151 Id. at 564-65. 
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what to do.  The Kass precedent that a corporation, a fictional person, has rights to conduct 
research on embryos under a contract (over the objection of a parent seeking to protect offspring) 
was founded on property law that ignored constitutional rights that protect parental rights to 
protect offspring.152  Further, the decision in Kass was based on erroneous misconceived science 
that thought the stored human embryo was not a human being and the decision was also based on 
case precedent in federal and state law that did not know when human life begins. 
 Yet, the importance that a procreation right had been exercised is reflected indirectly in 
the opinion, as the Kass court stressed that the agreement of the parties prior to the time of the 
procedure to create offspring was to govern by stating: 
[C]ourts seek to honor the parties’ expressions of choice, made before disputes 
erupt, with the parties’ over-all direction uppermost in the analysis. Knowing 
advance agreement will be enforced underscores the seriousness and the integrity 
of the consent process.  Advance agreements as to disposition would have little 
purpose if they were enforceable only in the event the parties continue to agree. To 
the extent possible it should be the progenitors---not the State----and not the courts-
-- who by their prior directive made this deeply personal choice.153  
 
  Note, a progenitor is one who has provided a gamete for the procreation of a child and 
one would need to procreate a child to be the child’s progenitor.154  The parties in Kass did not 
raise the issue of the legality of the clinic’s form presented to them that described the embryos as 
joint property.  Despite one of the progenitors’ coming to a decision of wanting to care and 
provide for the human beings created, a contract analysis of a clinic consent form resulted in the 
clinic receiving the embryos, because the court bound the progenitors to a contract that claimed 
the clinic had the authority to use embryos for research if the progenitors were undecided as to 
                                                          
152 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S 645, 651 (1972). 
153 Kass, 91 N.Y.2d at 566. 
154 Progenitor, ENGLISH OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/progenitor. 
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what to do.155  
E. FEDERAL COURT REFUSED STANDING TO HUMAN EMBRYOS IN DOE 
V. SHALALA. 
 
 When a ban was lifted on funding for research involving human embryos, a lawsuit was 
filed on behalf of Mary Doe, “a preborn child in being as a human embryo” along with other 
plaintiffs, to block a nationally appointed panel making guidelines about embryo research.156 
The court stated the embryo was not a “person” under the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore 
could not have a guardian appointed to represent her pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c) and further 
to have a guardian represent all 20,000 embryos believed to be in storage at that time would be 
an impossible task.157  
F. VIRGINIA FEDERAL COURT TREATED EMBRYOS, SPERM AND EGGS 
CONTAMINATED WITH HUMAN ALBUMIN EXPOSED TO CRUZEFELD-
JACOBS DISEASE AS AN ECONOMIC LOSS PRECLUDING RECOVERY 
UNDER NEGLIGENCE, AND CLAIMED PLAINTIFFS SOUGHT TO 
RECOVER A LOSS FOR PHYSICIAL HARM TO PROPERTY OTHER THAN 
THE ALBUMIN MANUFACTURED BY DEFENDANT, BAXTER, AND 
DISTRIBUTED BY DEFENDANT, IRVINE, IN DOE v. IRVINE SCIENTIFIC. 
 
 A class action lawsuit was brought by plaintiffs who underwent in-vitro fertilization 
treatment at the Jones Institute for Women’s Health.158  Specific plaintiffs, Jane and John Doe 
had embryos created with donor eggs from a third party, and John’s sperm.159  Three embryos 
were transferred to Jane Doe for hopeful implantation, while the other embryos were 
cryopreserved.160  The Jones Institute had utilized the Human Albumin product manufactured by 
Baxter Healthcare Corporation (Baxter) and was distributed by Irvine Scientific Sales Company 
                                                          
155 Kass, 91 N.Y.2d at 566. 
156 Doe v. Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 1421, 1423 (D. Md. 1994). 
157 Id. at 1426-27. 
158 Doe v. Irvine Scientific Sales Co., Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 737, 738 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 739. 
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(Irvine) in the process of creating the embryos.161  The Human Albumin was potentially 
contaminated by two donors to the pool of plasma from which the lots were processed, who were 
found to be at risk for Cruzeldt-Jacob Disease, which causes a fatal neurological disorder in 
humans.162  The plaintiffs claimed the Jones Institute was not timely informed of Baxter’s 
withdrawal of the contaminated Albumin and that it failed to timely warn the distributors and 
consumers in the stream of commerce about the dangers of the product.163  Plaintiffs further 
alleged that Irvine failed to timely cooperate with Baxter and withdraw the contaminated 
albumin and want of the dangers based on Federal Drug Administration recommendations.164 
Plaintiffs’ complaint sought recovery based on theories of personal injury, property damage, 
emotional distress and economic loss.165  
The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress was denied on the basis there was no record evidence that CJD had actually 
contaminated “the three reproductive organisms.”166  The Virginia Federal Court, without 
scientific analysis, equated the sperm, egg, and embryo to all be “reproductive organisms.”167  
Yet, a sperm by itself cannot make a human body, nor can an egg make a human body by 
itself. Unlike the human embryo, which has all the components needed to reveal the body plan in 
an orderly and temporal sequence both pre and postnatally, sperm and egg only have a plan to 
bind with another gamete.  While the court’s inaccurate scientific analysis of what a sperm and 
an egg is compared to an embryo did not refute the courts finding of no proof of contamination 
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or harm to the embryo, it revealed a lack of appreciation of the distinct difference between 
gametes and the procreated embryo. 
The Virginia Federal Court in analyzing whether the plaintiffs could recover in tort, 
reasoned the harm was to the embryos and the embryos were not persons pursuant to Roe v. 
Wade;168 and the court had not recognized a status that would entitle them to special treatment 
because of their potential of human life.169  The Virginia Federal Court did acknowledge the case 
of Davis v. Davis, which found the embryos deserved a special respect legal status for just the 
potential for life.170  Nonetheless, the Virginia Federal Court claimed Plaintiffs could not bring a 
tort action on the embryos behalf and dismissed the tort and negligence claim.171  
The Virginia Federal Court stated the gist of the Plaintiffs claim was to recover the loss 
of their stored embryos which were rendered unsafe for implantation as a result of being exposed 
to the recalled albumin.172  The court claimed the losses occurred, because the Jones Institute 
goods and services were unsatisfactory, the transferred embryos did not result in a pregnancy, 
and the other embryos were unsafe for implantation.173  The Virginia Federal Court reasoned the 
plaintiffs were seeking to recover from harm to “property” other than the albumin manufactured 
by Baxter and distributed by Irvine.174  The court characterized the plaintiffs’ loss as neither 
personal or property injury, but an economic loss, because economic expectations were 
disappointed.175  Plaintiffs could not recover against defendants for economic loss, because they 
                                                          
168 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (ruling the unborn were not persons as the word is used in the Fourteenth 
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169 Doe, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 742. 
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had not complied with the economic loss rule and showed privity with the defendants.176  Thus, 
the complaint was dismissed.177  
Today, if a court would equate the embryo as a “good” created in an IVF clinic, or 
property, or the equivalent of a gamete, then that would be an analysis based on flawed scientific 
facts and the Roe decision that did not know when human life began. 
G. IN AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION, MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS, 
AFFIREMED A TRIAL COURT DECISION ON CONTRACT AND CUSTODY 
CLAIMS INVOLVING “FROZEN HUMAN CELLS, (ZYGOTES)”, CLAIMING 
THE DISPUTE INVOLVED TWO GAMETE PROVIDERS AND 
UNDETERMINED RIGHTS OF EX-UTERO PREEMBRYONIC CELLS IN 
BOHN V. ANN ARBOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE ASSOCIATES, P. C.  
 
 A trial court in Michigan ruled that until the progenitors of embryos stored at the clinic 
would reach an agreement, their zygotes would remain cryopreserved and in the possession of 
the clinic.178  The opinion stated “[o]f the eighteen oocytes removed from plaintiff’s body and 
inseminated with defendant Mosbly’s sperm, eight became ‘partially fertilized’ or ‘zygotes,’ in 
that the two nuclei from the oocyte and the sperm did not merge and no cell division took 
place.”179  Three of the zygotes were transferred to the mother resulting in the birth of one child 
and five zygotes remained in storage.180  The Court of Appeals in the first footnote on the word 
“zygote” stated “[t]he stage of development and thus, the proper scientific term for these human 
cells is not clear from the limited record before us.  Although the term may not be accurate, we 
will refer to the cells at issue here as zygotes for purposes of this discussion.”181  
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 The Michigan court acknowledged that the case concerned a number of complicated 
questions concerning the parameters of human life and its protection for which there were no 
clearly defined answers in Michigan law or jurisprudence.182  The court reported that the state of 
Louisiana had codified the legal status of pre-embryos as persons referencing La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
Sec 9.124 (1991), but that Michigan had no comparable law.183  While the plaintiff mother, 
Bohn, had premised many of her claims to the embryos on a woman’s right to bodily integrity, 
the court said that was not at issue since a pregnancy was not involved.184  The court claimed the 
dispute involved two gamete providers and undetermined rights of ex-utero pre-embryonic 
cells.185   
 The Michigan court thought the facts in the case raised questions of the utmost gravity, 
and there was no question that the state had an interest in protecting “potential life.”186  The 
question of when life begins was not raised in the trial court; thus, the court declined to address a 
question that reached beyond those issues framed by the plaintiff in her complaint and cited in 
the trial court, but urged the Michigan legislature to attend to the profoundly complicated and 
unexplored area.187 
 The mother had argued that Black’s Law Dictionary defined a child as: “progeny; 
offspring of parentage, Unborn or recently born human being.”188  Thus, the Michigan Child 
Custody Act189applies to “children.”  The Court of Appeals did not want to extend the definition 
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of “child” as suggested by the plaintiff mother, stating authority in Michigan that such as 
extension would require legislative rather than judicial action.190  As a result, it did not address 
whether the father had an obligation of child support of zygotes, because the father consented to 
conception and there was no statutory authority for the support of zygotes and no child support 
issue raised.191 
The mother’s claim against the clinic for a breach of contract to transfer the zygotes to 
her, because documents indicated the medical staff had discretion as to whether zygotes would 
be transferred or preserved and a medical authorization form, does not constitute a contract under 
Michigan law.192  In addition, there was no writing signed by an authorized representative of the 
clinic as to the essential terms of the alleged contract.193  The count found no evidence of fraud 
or misrepresentation.194  Further, the court found no breach of the mother’s privacy by the clinic 
in releasing information to defendant, Mosley, that she had undergone the zygote intra fallopian 
transfer (ZIFT) and had five stored embryos, as he was co-creator of the zygotes and knew of 
their existence, and she had announced her complaint on television and it was proper for the 
defendant attorneys to look into the matter.195  The court noted the plaintiff could not claim the 
defendant clinic could not be charged with extreme and outrageous conduct in not releasing to 
her the embryos created from her ova, because she ignored that they were also created with 
defendant Mosley’s gametes.196  The plaintiff could not claim negligent infliction from 
emotional distress in watching the embryos “slowly die,” as the defendants presented evidence 
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that the embryos could be stored indefinitely.197 
 The Michigan Court of Appeals recognized an important issue in the case was when did 
human life begin, but did not think it had to address it since it was not addressed in the trial 
court.198  The Court of Appeals, which acknowledged that the state had an interest in protecting 
“potential life,” was not destroying life as it was informed that the embryos could stay stored 
indefinitely, but did not ask the future question as to whether that ruling meant the party that 
outlived the other party would have the ultimate decision on the embryos fate, nor did it decide if 
the zygotes were lives with potential rather than potential life.199  There was no discussion of the 
Michigan court about the differences between human cells and human beings other than 
deferring to the legislature to give it guidance in the future.200  Michigan choose not to publish its 
opinion and give it precedential value, yet it has been cited in an ACLU amicus brief in 
McQueen v. Gadberry,201 for the proposition that an embryo should not be allowed to be 
“procreated” by giving the embryo to the parent who wants continued life for the embryo and 
forcing the other parent to procreate.  Note, this was not what was stated by the Michigan Court. 
Further, the understanding that after sperm-egg binding a human organism does not exist is 
incorrect as explained in this article.  This case was not about frozen human cells like the HeLa 
cells used in tissue culture, but about frozen human beings in the earliest observable 
developmental stages.  Courts can take judicial notice of known scientific facts, unlike the 
Michigan Court of Appeals which admittedly did not know the accurate scientific description of 
the subjects at issue, and thought it was for the legislature to determine the rights of ex-utero pre-
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embryonic cells, not realizing the zygotes were human organisms with identities distinct from 
other organisms. 
H. ALABAMA LAW ALLOWED AGREED CONTRACT PLAIN LANGUAGE 
TO PERMIT A UNIVERSITY TO OWN EMBRYOS IN CAHILL v. CAHILL.  
 
 In Cahill v. Cahill, during a divorce proceeding in Alabama, the wife sought an award 
under a property theory for the three remaining zygotes stored in Michigan.202  The court began 
the resolution process asking for a copy of the contract signed with the University where the 
zygotes were stored.203  The actual contract was not found, but a blank form was provided to the 
court and the terms of the agreement were not disputed.204  Pursuant to the plain language, the 
agreement provided that if there was dissolution of marriage, the zygotes were relinquished to 
the “Physicians of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology.”205  The court ordered “the 
zygotes shall not be the property of either party” and according to the evidence, the University of 
Michigan appears to be the owners of the zygotes.206  The Cahill case demonstrates how like in 
Kass and Litowitz, the characterization of human life as property has led to corporate persons 
having rights to own human beings as property. 
I. THE MASSACHUSETTS COURT, DID NOT RECOGNIZE EMBRYOS CAME 
TO BE CREATED AS THE RESULT OF EXERCISED PROCREATION RIGHTS 
AND HELD A POLICY AGAINST FORCED PROCREATION WOULD USURP 
PRIOR PARTY AGREEMENT TO PERMIT EMBRYO DEVELOPMENT IN  
THE CASE OF A.Z. v. B.Z. 
 
        In A.Z. v. B.Z.,207 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts  examined consent forms signed 
by the parties and testimony about the conduct of the parties in executing the agreement and 
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concluded the forms did not represent the clear intention of the parties as to the proper 
disposition of their embryos should a later dispute arise between them.208  The court also 
examined the question of whether prior directives should ever be enforced by courts in embryo 
disputes.209  The court concluded that “even had the [progenitors] entered into an unambiguous 
agreement between themselves regarding the disposition of frozen pre-embryos, [it] would not 
enforce an agreement that would” permit the use of a frozen embryo for implantation by one 
progenitor over the objection of the other, because such an agreement “would compel one donor 
to become a parent against his or her will.”210  Further, the court ruled that “forced procreation is 
not an area amenable to judicial enforcement” and would violate public policy.211  No argument 
was made that the husband was already a parent or that the frozen embryos were human beings.  
No argument was made the frozen embryos were human beings entitled to the basic human right 
of life itself.  Basically, “conception was the goal in A.Z.-the desire not to be a parent was only 
manifested after conception had already taken place.”212  
J. NEW JERSEY CLINIC FORM DESCRIBED EMBRYOS AS MERE TISSUES 
AND PROVIDED FOR RELINQUISHMENT OF TISSUES TO THE CLINIC IN 
THE EVENT OF DIVORCE, UNLESS THE COURT SPECIFIED OTHERWISE, 
IN J.B v. M.B, WHERE THE COURT, RELYING ON DAVIS, THOUGHT THE 
RIGHT NOT TO PROCREATE SHOULD ORDINARILY PREVAIL WHEN 
PARTIES DISAGREE, AND HELD PARTY RIGHTS SHOULD BE BALANCED 
WHEN PARTIES DISAGREE AFTER ORIGINAL AGREEMENT AS TO THE 
EMBRYOS FATE. 
 
 J.B. filed a divorce complaint and asked for an order permitting the remaining seven 
embryos to be discarded, but M.B. sought to have the embryos implanted or donated to other 
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infertile couples.213  In the J.B. v. M.B. case, the court referenced the American Heritage 
Stedman’s Medical Dictionary for a definition of a pre-embryo as a fertilized ovum (egg cell) up 
to approximately fourteen days old (the point at which it implants in the uterus).214  In addition, 
the court emphasized how “[t]hroughout the opinion [they] use[d] the term ‘preembryo” rather 
than ‘embryo’ because a preembryo is technically descriptive of the cells stage of development 
when they are cryopreserved (frozen).”215   
Note that the courts use of words “cells stage of development” would not show the court 
had an understanding a human organism is what was cryopreserved.  It appears all the court 
references were to the American Heritage Stedmans Medical Dictionary.  The court reported a 
zygote develops into a four to eight-cell preembryo that are returned to a woman’s uterus for 
implantation or cryopreserved.216  
J.B.’s and M.B.’s consent agreement with the clinic stated in pertinent part: “I, J.B. 
(patient), and M.B. (partner) agree that all control, direction and ownership of our tissues will be 
relinquished to the IVF Program under the following circumstances: 1. A dissolution of marriage 
by court order, unless the court specifies who takes control and direction of the tissues.”217 
  In analyzing the consent form, the court held that the thrust of the document was that the 
clinic obtains control over the pre-embryos unless the parties choose otherwise in a writing, or 
unless a court directs otherwise in the case of divorce.218  The court first did a contact analysis 
and found that there was not a binding separate contact providing for disposition, but a decision 
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that in the event of divorce the court was to be the one to decide the disposition of the pre-
embryos.219   
M.B. had sought a remand to the lower court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine 
the parties’ intentions at the time of the I.V.F. procedure.220  However, the court did not remand 
the case to the trial court to take evidence on husband’s claim, that there were extensive 
discussions, as to whether they were going to use the embryos themselves or donate to others.  The 
husband also claimed his religious convictions and the state interest in protecting human life 
should take precedence over his wife not wanting to use the embryos as agreed. The wife claimed 
giving the husband the embryos was violative of public policy and her right not to procreate. 
The court held that a formal, unambiguous memorialization of the parties intentions 
would be required to confirm their prior agreement and that since such writing was lacking and 
held that J.B. and M. B. never entered into a binding contract providing for the disposition of the 
pre-embryosin the possession of the Cooper Center.221  The court, also, agreed with Davis, 
supra, that “[ordinarily the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail.”222  But, the court 
disagreed as to the strict enforcement of contracts stating: “[w]e believe that the better rule, and 
the one we adopt is to enforce agreements entered into at the time in vitro fertilization is begun, 
subject to the right of either party to change their mind about disposition or use or destruction of 
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any stored pre-embryos.”223  Finally, if there is disagreement as to the disposition because one 
party has reconsidered his or her earlier decision, the interests of both parties must be 
evaluated.224  
Thus, the failure of court to recognize embryos were not mere tissue as described in the 
clinic form, or undifferentiated cells as described in Davis, but deliberately created human beings 
led to a perpetuation of the Robertson principle accepted by the Davis court, that a right to avoid 
procreation should prevail on the mistaken factual understanding that an embryo was 
undifferentiated cells that would first be placenta and cord cells before the body of the embryo 
was formed. 
K. IN RHODE ISLAND, THREE COUPLES SUING AN IVF CLINIC FOR LOSS 
OF “PRE-EMBRYOS” WERE ALLOWED TO PROCEED WITH A CLAIM FOR 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DUE TO BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR WHICH 
THE CLINIC CLAIMED THE DEFENSE OF ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK, 
BUT NOT A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.  
 
  In Frisina v. Women & Infants Hospital of Rhode Island, three couples sought recovery 
against the IVF clinic for loss of their embryos under a theory that they suffered emotional 
distress and that their right of action in their pre-embryos was because embryos were 
“irreplaceable property.”225  The Frisina, court referenced A.Z. v. B.Z. for the statement that the 
term pre-embryo is used to describe the four to eight cell developmental stage of a fertilized 
egg.226  The Frisina court also looked at the embryos custody dispute precedent regarding 
parental rights and interest in their embryos.227  The clinic claimed the damages were the failure 
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to achieve a pregnancy, and under Rhode Island law since there was no recovery for a nonviable 
fetus there should not be recovery for a pre-embryo.228  
The court found that given that Rhode Island law did not allow recovery for a nonviable 
fetus, the plaintiffs were not present when the embryos were lost, and they did not have a 
physical manifestation of their emotional distress, they failed to meet the elements for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.229  The court agreed, however; that the plaintiffs were seeking to 
recover for loss of the embryos and not the failure to achieve a pregnancy and further found that 
while the plaintiffs signed an informed consent acknowledging that the embryos could be lost 
due to laboratory error, they did not exculpate the clinic from the clinic’s negligence.230 
Therefore the plaintiff could pursue a cause of action for a breach of contract causing emotional 
distress. 
Thus, while Frisina was not asked to claim that “pre-embryos” were persons and rely on 
other case precedent for its understanding of the nature of the embryo, it found a cause of action 
for the specific loss of the “pre-embryo” at that stage of development, and did not require an 
analysis of whether the particular lost embryos would have ultimately been born, albeit by a 
property based theory awarding parents the loss of “irreplaceable property.” 
L. THE WASHINGTON COURT CLAIMED THERE WAS NO AUTHORITY 
BEFORE IT AS TO WHETHER “PRE-EMBRYO” OR CHILD WAS THE 
PROPER TERM AND THE COURT DENIED THE REQUEST OF EACH 
PARTY TO HAVE THE EMBRYOS FOR IMPLANTATION AND AWARDED 
THE EMBRYOS TO THE CLINIC BASED ON CONTRACT LANGUAGE IN 
LITOWITZ v. LITOWITZ. 
 
 In Litowitz v. Litowitz, a question before the court was the award of two cryopreserved 
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embryos to David Litowitz.231  Both divorcing parties wanted the frozen embryos to be 
implanted, but Becky Litowitz, who had no uterus, wanted to have them implanted in a surrogate 
and to raise them herself.232  On the other hand, David Litowitz wanted to have them placed for 
adoption.233  The trial court had applied a best interest of the child standard and awarded them to 
David holding adoption by a two parent family was in the best interest of the child.234  
 The Washington Appellate Court looked at the contract and concluded that the contract 
did not require a continuation of a family plan not to have another child and thought David 
Litowitz had a right not to procreate and he was given the embryos because adoption allowed 
him to avoid an unwanted parenting role.235 
 The Washington Supreme Court applied the Davis framework principles, noting that 
Becky argued the egg donor contract gave her a right to the “pre-embryos” and biological 
parenting should not be the only factor in deciding who received the embryos.236  The court 
differentiated between the egg donor contract and the cryopreservation contract and held the egg 
donor contract did not apply to fertilized eggs.237  Becky argued the term “child” rather than the 
term “pre-embryo” was the appropriate term for the court to consider and that she had a 
constitutional right to the custody and companionship of a child.238  While the trial judge 
characterized the “pre-embryo” as a “child,” the Washington Supreme Court thought the issue 
whether a pre-embryo was a child was not a logical or relevant inquiry under the record before 
                                                          
231 48 P.3d 261, 262 (Wash. App. Ct. 2002). 
232 Id.  
233 Id. at 264. 
234 Id. at 272. 
235 Id. at 265. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 268. 
238 Id. at 269. 
 51 
 
the court and the argument was not supported by sufficient authority.239 
 In making its ruling, the Litowitz court stated it did not have to engage in a medical or 
philosophical discussion whether the pre-embryos were children or if Becky was a progenitor 
without citing additional authority.240  The decision was solely based on the cryopreservation 
contract.241  Here,    
[t]hey directed that the remaining pre-embryos be ‘thawed out but not allowed to 
undergo further development and disposed of when the pre-embryos have been 
maintained in cryopreservation for five (5) years under the initial date of 
cryopreservation unless the Center agreed at [the Litowitzes’ request, to extend 
[their] participation for an additional period of time.242 
 
The record did not indicate if the two cryopreserved pre-embryos were still in existence, and 
neither party had requested an extension of time.243  The court concluded that “[c]ustody of the 
remaining two pre-embryos was taken by the Loma Linda Center under the cryopreservation 
contract on the date the other three were implanted in the surrogate mother.”244  Thus, the award 
to David Litowitz was reversed. 245 
 Justice Chambers commented that the case should have been remanded to the trial court 
to evaluate the case under a contract principle.246  Another justice noted the contract provided for 
a court order in the event of divorce and the contractual storage limit was tolled by the filing of 
the lawsuit.247  Justice Sanders emphasized what the parties did not intend was for the subject of 
the contract to be destroyed, and he could not fault a trial judge who reached a result to at least 
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effectuate the intent of the parties and recognized the contract dealt with the prospect that a child 
would be born, and the future of which was of paramount concern and profound responsibility.248  
  Essentially, the Litowitz court by applying a strict contract resolution to the dispute over 
the embryos fate treated the embryos as property on the basis there was not authority before it to 
establish that the embryos were children.  The Litowitz case is an example of innocent human 
lives being terminated by court order, contrary to the intent of both parties/parents requesting the 
clinic not to have control of the embryos for destruction pursuant to a form provided to the 
parties/parents by the clinic. 
M. THE IOWA COURT WOULD NOT RESOLVE A DISPUTE OVER THE 
STORED EMBRYOS FATE BETWEEN PROGENITORS/PARENTS CLAIMING 
THAT IOWA COURTS CONCERN IS WITH BORN CHILDREN AND DID NOT 
RECOGNIZE REPRODUCTION HAD ALREADY OCCURRED IN RE: 
MARRIAGE OF WITTEN. 
 
 In the case of In Re: Marriage of Witten, the male progenitor, Trip, did not want to 
destroy the embryos but did not want his ex-wife Tamera to have them.249  The court was to 
determine if either party could use or dispose of their embryos without the consent of the 
other.250  The court was to determine if the embryos have the legal status of children pursuant to 
Iowa Dissolution of Marriage statutes and not to address the moral and philosophical status of 
the embryos.251  The court stated in Iowa that the state is concerned for the physical, emotional 
and psychological well-being of children who have been born, not fertilized eggs that have not 
resulted in a pregnancy.252  The court believed it was against public policy to force an agreement 
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in the highly personal area of “reproductive choice.”253  The court did not recognize that 
reproduction had already taken place.  The Witten court noted that “[w]hether embryos are 
viewed as having life or simply as having the potential for life, this characteristic or potential 
renders embryos fundamentally distinct from the chattels, real estate and money that are the 
subject of antenuptial agreements.”254  Thus, unlike contracts where property is distributed 
according to prenuptial agreements, the state would not intervene to make a decision or enforce a 
disputed contract on the embryos fate, but required the parents to resolve the matter by their 
contemporaneous mutual consent.255  
 Although the court rejected a contract approach to resolving a dispute about disposition 
of the parties’ stored embryos, it would honor a contract where the parties did not dispute.256  
The court stated there would be no use or disposition of the embryos until the parties reached an 
agreement, with the caveat that the clinic was not required to store the embryos beyond the time 
in the clinic contract.257  
 The Witten embryo dispute contemporaneous mutual consent resolution model, which 
was similar to the resolution model of the Michigan Court of Appeals in Bohn, was criticized 
subsequently for not resolving the dispute between the parent/progenitors who were seeking the 
courts assistance, and would result in being able to leave one party hostage to the other who 
refuses to agree.258   
This mutual consent resolution model seems to award the decision as to the embryos fate 
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to the parent who outlives the other parent and runs the risk of pushing embryo disposition 
decisions to future generations, since frozen embryos can outlive their progenitors.  Live births 
have been reported from stored embryos a decade and more (even up to twenty-four years) after 
cryopreservation.259  Most importantly, the contemporaneous mutual consent resolution model 
does not recognize the dignity of a human being by making an embryo dispute resolution in the 
same manner as other disputes parents have over children when parents disagree and the court 
determines what is in the best interest of the child. 
N. IN ARIZONA, THE COURT ALLOWED PARENTS TO SUE A CLINIC FOR 
LOSS OF FIVE EMBRYOS UNDER THEORIES OF BREACH OF A BAILMENT 
CONTRACT, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND NEGLIGENT LOSS OR 
DESTRUCTION OF PRE-EMBRYOS, BUT NOT FOR WRONGFUL DEATH. 
 The Arizona court looked at other state precedent, and the lack of an Arizona Legislative 
determination about a conception outside the womb of a “three day old 8- cell pre-embryo”  was 
not a person, and based on “statutory construction, the status of scientific knowledge concerning 
embryonic development, the ongoing discussion concerning  when  life begins, the unintended 
consequences that may result” if an embryo was a person and declined to make a judicial 
determination that the legislature intended to allow a cause of action under the wrongful death 
act for loss of an embryo.260  In further discussing the basis for the court’s opinion, the court 
explained that the plaintiff, Jeter was not making a case that the embryo ex-utero can survive, 
exist and develop ex-utero, but were claiming the pre-embryos would become viable, if later 
implanted in the womb.261  The Jeter court believed expanding the definition of viability to 
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potential viability would counter Arizona case precedent and legislative intent that would 
consider the entity “viable” only when the entity could exist and fully develop to birth outside 
the womb.262  
 Pursuant to Summerfield v. Superior Court, the Arizona court had allowed plaintiffs to 
sue for wrongful death in a malpractice action against a physician for the stillbirth of a thirty-
seven week old fetus, holding that under Arizona law a “viable fetus” was encompassed in the 
word “person” for purposes of the wrongful death act.263  Subsequently, the Arizona legislature 
did not amend the wrongful death statute to include application to a non-viable fetus or 
cryopreserved three day old embryo.  Therefore, the Jeter court concluded the Arizona 
legislature approved of limiting recovery under the wrongful death statute to viable fetuses.264  
The Jeter court reviewed multiple references and recited its understanding of the 
scientific facts of embryonic development including the following:  
Traditionally an egg is fertilized by the combining of an egg and a sperm, which 
are collectively referred to as gametes. Once an egg is fertilized, whether in vivo or 
in vitro, it can be referred to as a one-cell zygote. After two to three days of division, 
the cells are blastomeres. At that time, the pre-embryo consists of eight cells, all of 
which are totipotent, meaning that any of the cells could develop into any type of 
tissue and could theoretically develop into eight separate fetuses. At four to six 
days, it is .1 millimeter in diameter, at which time the cells begin to separate and 
migrate. 
 
If growth proceeds normally, the outer cells will eventually become the placenta 
and tissue supporting the fetus while the inner cells, called the inner cell mass, will 
become the fetus. At five to six days of development, it is called a blastocyst and 
consists of a hollow ball of approximately 100 cells. These cells are pluripotent, 
meaning that they have started to specialize but can still develop into various types 
of tissue. Scientists are still learning how the cells function at this point of 
development. 
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By the ninth or tenth day, if in vivo and if it has continued to develop, the 
blastocyst will implant in the uterine wall. At day fourteen, a critical development 
occurs-the creation of the primitive streak with three layers of specialized cells 
that will develop into all the fetus' tissues and cells if development continues. At 
this point it has approximately 2000 cells; the groove or middle line reflects a 
head-tail and left-right orientation. By day 22 of normal development, the heart 
begins to beat, and, by day 40, some body parts are recognizable in primitive 
form. At eight weeks, if it has continued to develop, most of the organ systems 
have appeared. 
 
As noted above, the occurrence of each of these events depends on the ability of 
the organism to continue to develop. This is problematic because the percentage 
of pre-embryos that develop into a fetus and a live birth is not high, regardless 
whether it is developing in vivo or in vitro, but it is significantly lower for 
cryopreserved pre-embryos. The President's Council on Bioethics has estimated 
that, in 2001, only 32.8% of assisted reproductive technology fertilized organisms 
developed into a pregnancy if not cryopreserved. Only 27% led to live births.   
For cryopreserved pre-embryos, only 65% survived thawing and only 20.3% led 
to live births. Moreover, in 2001, 72% of all assisted reproductive technology 
transfers failed to lead to a birth.265  
 
 The Jeter court’s report of the scientific facts, in 2005, does not recognize as reported, 
infra, in this paper, that cells within the embryo at a one cell stage may already be forming the 
body axis, and by day three of development each of the cells within the embryo are already 
executing their own programs for the development of the organism.  The scientific fact report by 
the Jeter court notes statistics about the low percentage of eventual live births due to the low 
percentage of survival of unborn human life as reported for ex-utero human life.  The Jeter court 
indicated the fact that many variables may affect whether an embryo is born makes it speculative 
to conclude in a wrongful death action that “but for the injury” to the “fertilized egg” a child 
would have been born and therefore entitled to bring a lawsuit for the injury.266  Thus, for 
purposes of considering an embryo a person under the wrongful death act, the fact proving 
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causation of death by another would be speculative due to the high risk of death already present 
in the embryo, was a reason listed to support  the Jeter court’s conclusion not to consider the ex-
utero embryo a person under the Arizona wrongful death statute.267  
The Jeter court also expressed a concern that considering an embryo a person under the 
wrongful death statute could have the unintended consequence of making clinics liable for 
wrongful death claims.268  The court then also examined at what stage “society” (consisting of 
scientists, philosophers, ethicists and the public on the whole) should consider when human life 
begins, and reported on opposing viewpoints, declaring the Arizona legislature is in a better 
position than the court to determine if the word “person” in the Arizona wrongful death statute 
should include embryos.269  The Jeter court reviewed the societal interests in stem cell 
research270 balanced against respect for human life to support its opinion that it was not the duty 
of the court to determine if an embryo was protected as a person under the Arizona wrongful 
death act.271  
 The Jeter court emphasized that the court’s conclusion that absent clear legislative 
direction the three day old, eight cell pre-embryos are not “persons under the Arizona wrongful 
death statute, [and]…does not mean they are property.”272  The Jeter court then cited the Davis 
court for the principle that embryos are entitled to “special respect” because of their “potential to 
                                                          
267 Id. at 1272. 
268 Id. at 1264. 
269 Id. at 1267-68. 
270  Note it was not until 2007 that it was discovered that induced pluripotent stem cells can be 
made from skin cells, essentially making adult skin cells turn back their cellular instructions to 
an earlier embryonic stage for use in stem cell therapy. See Martin Fackler, Risk taking is in 
his genes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2007) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/11/science/11prof.html?_r=0. 
271 Jeter, 121 P.3d at 1269. 
272 Id. at 1270. 
 58 
 
become persons” and are due varying degrees of respect depending on the issue involved.273  The 
Jeter court then went on to elaborate that this holding did not deny all causes of action for the 
loss of embryos and upheld the claims for negligent loss or destruction of the pre-embryos, 
breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of bailment contract.274  
O. TEXAS COURT WAS NOT ASKED TO DETERMINE IF EMBRYOS WERE 
“JOINT PROPERTY” AND FOLLOWED CONTRACT LAW, EVEN THOUGH 
THE COURT RECOGNIZED EMBRYOS ARE DISTINCT FROM CHATTLES, 
REAL ESTATE AND MONEY IN ROMAN v. ROMAN. 
 
  In Roman v. Roman, the embryo agreement at issue referred to the embryos as “joint 
property” and because it was not necessary to the disposition of the appeal, the court did not 
address characterization of the embryos as “joint property.”275  The wife in Roman challenged 
the validity of a signed embryo storage agreement indicating in the event of divorce, the embryos 
were to be discarded.276  The Roman court reviewed the three resolution approaches have been 
used: (1) best interest of the child; (2) a contractual approach and (3) a contemporaneous mutual 
consent model.277  The court noted that embryos were fundamentally distinct from chattels, real 
estate, and money which are the subjects of ante prenuptial agreements.278 
  Next, the Roman court reviewed its state law on assisted reproduction and gestational 
agreements contained within the Uniform Parentage Act and found no directive on determining 
embryo disposition in a divorce.279  Then, the Roman court viewed other state law on gestational 
agreements and gleaned from Texas law that there was no public policy against deciding the 
                                                          
273 Id. at 1271. 
274 Id. at 1271, 1276. 
275 Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, n.7 (Tex. App. 2006). 
276 Id. at 44-45. 
277 Id. at 48, n.9. 
278 Id. at n.10. 
279 Id. at 49. 
 59 
 
disposition of frozen embryos in the event such as divorce, death, or changed circumstances.280  
  The Roman court then analyzed the embryo agreement under contract law principles.281  
The progenitors did not dispute the pages in the agreement were initialed and signed and that in 
the event of divorce the embryos were to be discarded.282  The wife claimed she did not 
understand the agreement to apply until after she had a successful implantation, but the court 
held the language was clear.283  The wife raised the argument that the husband “breached the 
intent and purpose of the IVF agreements,” but did not cite authority or argument for that 
position, so it was not considered.284  The wife also argued her husband deceived her as to his 
true state of mind, so there was no meeting of the minds, but the court found that parole evidence 
did not replace the unambiguous written contract language.285  The wife also argued the 
agreement was moot because the center agreed to do whatever the court ordered it to do, but 
cited no authority for that argument and it was denied.286  The agreement in effect at the time of 
the divorce controlled, and the court ordered the embryos discarded.287  
 The Roman case is another example that a description of embryos as “joint property” 
results in progenitors being informed embryos can be thrown away and courts based on contract 
law analysis order termination of innocent human life, even when a parent claims the contract 
was not understood and wants the embryo to grow and develop.  The wife in Roman did not 
provide the court with authority that she was denied her unalienable rights to care for the health 
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of her offspring and her pursuit of happiness to care for the life created and to have the 
companionship of the created life. 
P. WITHOUT SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF THE EMBRYOS, 
OR ARGUMENT THE AGREEMENT WAS INVALID, THE OREGON COURT 
FOUND EMBRYOS DEFINED IN A CLINC AGREEMENT AS PERSONAL 
PROPERTY, ALSO MET THE BROAD DEFINITION OF PROPERTY UNDER 
OREGON LAW IN DAHL v. ANGLE. 
 
In Dahl v. Angle, the father in an embryo property settlement dispute stated “there is no 
pain greater than having participated in the demise of your own child.”288  In describing the 
subjects of the dispute, the court noted that the agreement of the parties in the appendix defined 
the embryos as cleaving embryos, as distinguished from zygotes and blastocysts and there was 
no trial evidence regarding the embryos’ stage of development.289  The Dahl court ruled that a 
contractual right to dispose of embryos created during a marriage constitutes personal property 
under Oregon law and is subject to the court’s authority to distribute embryos in a subsequent 
dissolution proceeding.290  Secondly, the court held it had the authority to distribute the embryos 
in a manner of distribution of that property that is “just and proper in all circumstances.”291 
  In reaching the decision, the Dahl court reviewed the language in the storage agreement 
between the University and the “clients” that labeled the embryos as personal property and that 
the “clients represent and warrant they have lawful possession of and the legal right and 
authority to store the embryos under the terms of this agreement.”292  The court determined 
pursuant to the case of In Re Marriage of Massee,293 that the definition of property as something 
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“[t]hat is or may be owned or possessed, or the exclusive right to possess, use, enjoy or dispose 
of a thing” was a definition broad enough to apply to embryos.294  Dahl accepted the resolution 
framework set forth by Davis, as consistent with Oregon law that gave effect to prenuptial 
agreements, and state policy enforcing marital agreements.295  
 While the agreement did not address disposition in the event of marital dissolution or 
separation, it did contemplate the contingency of who had the primary authority as decision 
maker if the parties disagreed and the agreement stated the wife was the decision maker.296  At 
the trial court level, the husband denied he ever initialed or read the agreement and stated he 
signed only the last page without a notary present; however, the trial court found the husband 
was not untruthful, but had an inaccurate recollection.297  The validity of the contract was not 
challenged further.  On appeal, the husband did not argue the agreement was ambiguous or 
invalid for public policy reasons.298   
 Thus, the appellate court in Dahl did not honor the husband’s request to balance his 
“belief” that the embryos are life and his desire to donate the embryos in a way to allow “his 
offspring to develop their full potential as human beings” should outweigh the wife’s interest in 
avoiding genetic parenthood.299  On appeal, the court did not find the trial court had abused its 
discretion in determining to give effect to the embryo disposition agreement.300   
The confusion regarding the legal status of the embryo may have led the husband in Dahl 
to argue a just and proper distribution of “property” applied to embryos pursuant to Oregon 
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marital dissolution laws, although to him, the embryos were “living things” he did not want 
killed; and the wife, who wanted the embryos destroyed argued that the embryos were not 
“property” subject to a distribution of marital property, but if they were, then the court could not 
impose a genetic parental relationship.301  Perhaps, the father reasoned the best chance to save 
the embryos was to have them classified as property in hope a fair and just distribution of 
property in divorce would give the embryos a chance at continued life, while the mother who 
wished for no action to be taken to preserve the lives of the offspring argued against a property 
status.  Factually, it is important to note that the progenitors already establish genetic parenthood 
and not the courts, and therefore the courts in balancing rights, should accurately define the 
rights to be weighed. 
Q. IN FLORIDA, CASE LAW DID NOT ADDRESS THE NATURE OF THE 
EMBRYO, BUT ONLY PARTY RIGHTS PURUSANT TO SETTLEMENT 
ENFORCEMENT IN VITAKIS V. VALCHINE. 
 
  In Vitakis v. Valchine, the parties, a divorcing husband and wife, saw a mediator, and the 
wife had claimed she entered her divorce mediation agreement under duress and coercion.302  
Part of the settlement agreement was for the wife to “provide” the couple’s frozen embryos to 
the husband so he could dispose of them, and further that the divorce agreement could only be 
modified by written agreement.303  The appellate court had first remanded the case to the trial 
court that found no mediator misconduct, or duress or coercion and upheld the settlement 
agreement.304  After the ruling that the settlement agreement was enforceable, the husband filed 
a motion to force the wife to provide the embryos to him.305  The wife argued that during the 
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pendency of the appeals her husband had a “change of heart” granting her the embryos, but she 
had nothing in writing modifying the agreement.306  Thus, the court on appeal affirmed that the 
settlement agreement was valid.307 
 Florida statutory law refers to the nature of the embryo as a pre-embryo.308  In Vitakis v. 
Valchine, there was no mention of any party challenging the nature of the embryo, so the 
humanity of the embryo and the constitutional rights of a parent to protect offspring was not 
raised by this decision.  Further, as explained in this article, “preembryo” was a term that the 
Davis court adopted from the American Fertility Society that had believed there was no cellular 
differentiation in the early developing embryo until implantation.  As discussed in the article, 
the label of “pre-embryo” is not a scientific term that actually describes the composition and the 
behavior of the early human embryo based on what is known about the early human embryo in 
2018. 
R. ILLINOIS HOLDS ITS WRONGFUL DEATH ACT IS IN DEROGATION OF 
THE COMMON LAW AND MUST BE STRICLTY CONSTRUED, AND, 
THEREFORE, ONLY THE LEGISLATURE CAN DETERMINE IF THERE IS 
RECOVERY FOR LOSS OF AN UNIMPLANTED EMBRYO. 
  
 The Illinois Wrongful Death Act permits recovery for death of a person.309  The law 
provides that the “state of gestation or development of a human being” when the injury is 
caused would not prohibit a cause of action.310  The term “human being” was not defined in the 
Wrongful Death Act, so the court looked to legislative history.311  The legislative history did not 
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mention in vitro fertilization embryos.312  The court found the purpose of Section 2.2 was to 
extend a cause of action to pregnancies in the mother’s body regardless of whether the fetus was 
viable or nonviable and therefore refused to extend the statute to apply to embryos created by in 
vitro fertilization that were not implanted in the mother.313  The court further pronounced that 
the language “the state of gestation” refers to the in utero fetus and “the stage of development” 
refers to the live born fetus.314 
 The Illinois Court had not addressed the fact that the culture medium in which the 
embryos are stored acts like an artificial womb and that the growth and development of 
embryos are factually observed in the culture medium.  
S. IN ARKANSAS, A CLINIC DISPOSITION STATEMENT GIVING THE 
CLINIC CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF TISSUES IN THE EVENT OF A 
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE PREVAILED OVER THE WIFE’S 
OBJECTION CLAIMING THE HUSBAND HAD AGREED IN A MARITAL 
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT THAT SHE COULD DECIDE EMBRYO 
DISPOSITION. 
 
   In Dodson v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sciences, the Federal Court ruled that the Arkansas 
state court had applied state law and upheld pre-IVF agreement that a university would take 
control of couple’s frozen pre-embryos in the case of divorce, and that the federal courts were 
barred from revisiting that holding under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which claims federal 
district courts generally lack subject matter jurisdiction over attempted appeals from state court 
judgment.315  A review of the facts in the underlying state case reveals that the clinic described 
the embryos to the husband and wife as “tissue” and the court believed biological parenthood 
                                                          
312 Id. at 845. 
313 Id. at 840. 
314 601 F.3d 750, 752 (8th Cir. 2010), 
315 Id. at 754, 756.  
 65 
 
did not begin until after birth.316  The facts also indicate the dispute was initially attempted to be 
resolved in a marital property settlement.317   
 The plaintiffs, Dodson, the wife, and her husband, Lay, had eighteen cryopreserved 
embryos in storage at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS).318  The UAMS 
had a disposition statement, which indicated that in the event of martial dissolution by court 
order then “all control and direction of [their] tissues will be relinquished to the medical 
director.”319  The UAMS had acknowledged that Dodson and Lay would control and direct 
disposition of the tissues.320  Further, at any time prior to implantation in Dodson’s uterus the 
couple or surviving spouse could have the tissues destroyed, used for medical research, or 
transferred to the custody of another physician at another health care facility.321 
 During 1997 divorce proceedings the court affirmed a property settlement where the 
terms of the UAMS disposition statement were affirmed, but in addition it was decreed Dodson 
“shall have the right to choose from available options, if any, for disposition listed in the 
[Disposition Statement].”322  Subsequently, in 1999, Dobson requested UAMS transfer the 
embryos to her, but UAMS would not do so without Lay’s consent.323  Lay only consented to 
the three options in the disposition statement, but did not consent to transfer to Dobson for 
implantation.324  Dobson sought relief in chancery court that determined the UAMS disposition 
statement was in control and UAMS who was not a party  and the chancery court stated it would 
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not interpret a third party contract.325  
 Subsequently, UAMS offered Dobson twenty-one days in which to exercise one of the 
three options in the disposition statement.326  Dodson filed a declaratory judgment action against 
UAMS, the UAMS Chancellor, the IVF Program Director, and later substituted in the UAMS 
Board of Trustees for the Chancellor and the Director.327 
Dodson alleged that her ex-husband had relinquished his right to consent or object to the 
implantation of certain embryos into her, and secondly that she had fulfilled her rights and 
obligations to UAMS.328  Third, plaintiff alleged UAMS must fulfill its obligation to her and 
implant the embryos.329  Fourth, Dodson requested a preliminary injunction prohibiting UAMS 
from disposing or injuring the embryos until a final hearing on the merits.330 
  The court denied the cause of action explaining that Dodson along with Lay had agreed 
to let the IVF Program control the embryos in the event of a divorce and the Director was 
reasonable in giving Dodson three of the previous agreed dispositions to select.331  The court 
further found that it was reasonable for the program Director to request the ex-husband’s 
consent “to become a biological father.”332  Dobson appealed the ruling to the Arkansas 
Supreme Court, but her case was dismissed because she failed to order a transcript of the 
chancery court proceedings.333 
 The Dodson case is another example of a clinic drafted disposition of an embryo 
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agreement trumping the rights of a parent to protect offspring by not recognizing the offspring 
as a human being but referring to the procreated embryo as tissue.  While clinic documents 
defining rights of the parties may be essential to clinic functions, the clinics need to accurately 
state that who is being created is not mere cells and tissue, but an identifiable human organism, 
who is distinguishable from all other human organisms, in accordance with currently known and 
observed biological facts. 
T. FEDERAL COURT DENIES A CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT THAT DID 
NOT NAME THE PLAINTIFF’S “PARTICULARIZED CHARACTERISTICS” 
IN DOE v. OBAMA.  
 
   In Doe v. Obama, Mary Scott Doe, a human embryo on behalf of other embryos in 
storage and potential adoptive parents sought in the trial court to block federally funded research 
on human embryonic stem cells as violating the embryos Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights, and the Dickey Wicker Amendment prohibiting federal funds for destruction of human 
embryos.334  The Fourth Circuit found that the progenitor/parents of the embryos were the ones 
who caused the embryos to be donated for research and there was no evidence that it was the 
executive order permitting research that caused harm to the embryos.335  The court noted that 
Mary Scott Doe could have been placed for adoption by her parents and there was no proof she 
was harmed.336  The trial court found that the allegations were to an “amorphous frozen embryo 
class” and parents who may want to adopt in the future.337  The court found this case at least 
acknowledged that a complaint might have described particular characteristics and harm done to 
particular embryos.  The court’s “conclusion that plaintiffs cannot establish standing in this case 
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is a narrow one, for [it] do[es] not suggest that no party would ever have standing to assert 
similar claims.”338  Further, “[t]he bar of standing must not be set too high, lest many regulatory 
actions escape review contrary to the intent of Congress.”339  The court indicated that “[a] 
complaint that provided more concrete information about the identity of the named plaintiff 
embryo or the plaintiff parents' plans for adoption would at least address more directly what the 
Supreme Court has identified as serious constitutional concerns.”340 
 Note that embryos belonging to specific couples in divorce cases can be identified and 
likely have documentation in a medical record describing the developmental stage and 
appearance of each embryo.  The rights of parents to protect their particular embryos and to 
bring a cause of action to protect them is in accordance with the spirit of the Declaration of 
Independence and the many state constitutions that protect inalienable rights and that recognizes 
that we were each created with endowed inalienable rights and the job of government is to 
protect those rights. 
U. THE OHIO COURT CLAIMED A FATHER FAILED TO CITE ANY 
AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT THE CLAIM THAT THE THIRTEENTH 
AMENDMENT APPLIES TO FROZEN EMBRYOS, AND UPHELD 
ENFORCEMENT OF A CLINIC DOCUMENT DEFINING THE EMBRYOS AS 
PROPERTY AND GIVING DISPOSTION TO THE WIFE AFTER DIVORCE AS 
PREVIOUSLY AGREED IN THE SIGNED CLINIC DOCUMENT IN CWIK V. 
CWIK. 
 
  In Cwik v. Cwik under a heading marked by the court as “III. Property Issues, A. Frozen 
Embryos,” the court reported that the father argued that it would be in the best interest of the 
embryos that he be granted custody of the embryos because he would hire a surrogate to give 
birth to the embryos, but the trial court had upheld an informed consent document that he has 
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signed earlier declaring the embryos were the sole property of his wife.341  While the court noted 
that he had cited the Thirteenth Amendment in support of his argument that the clinic contract 
was unconstitutional, the court stated he failed to cite any authority to support this claim.342 
Instead, the court referenced Doe v. Obama, for the proposition that courts have not afforded 
frozen embryos legally protected interests akin to persons, so embryos would not be persons 
under the Thirteenth Amendment.343 
 Secondly, the husband argued that the clinic document was unconscionable and should 
not be upheld.344  The Ohio Court referenced Karmasu v. Karmasu,345 which held a trial court 
“had no authority or jurisdiction to interfere in a contract made between the parties herein and a 
third party, which was not a party to the divorce action.”346  Thus, the Ohio court found there 
was no abuse of discretion in the trial court awarding the embryos to the mother pursuant to the 
signed contract.347 
 Note, the decision in Doe v. Obama, supra, did not specifically address the merits of the 
class of embryos claims under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment because the court 
found specific characteristics of the embryos and the harm suffered were not described to 
indicate there was standing for an actual case or controversy because the only embryos 
researched on would be embryos whose parents consented to donate them to research.  The court 
never considered the logic that no human being has been classified as property since the 
Thirteenth Amendment was ratified in 1865 and to treat human beings as property is contrary to 
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the Thirteenth Amendment, particularly when balanced against parental constitutional rights to 
protect their begotten offspring.  
V. NEITHER PARENT CHALLENGED THE PROPERTY 
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE EMBRYOS, YET PENNSYLVANIA COURT 
RAISES ISSUE OF WHEN PROCREATION OCCURS IN PURPOSEFULLY 
CREATING EMBRYOS, AND DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN AGREEMENTS 
BETWEEN EACH PARENT AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CLINICS AND 
PARENTS IN REBER v. REISS. 
 
 In Reber v. Reiss, the Superior Court analyzed the form entitled “Informed Consent for 
Cryopreservation and Storage of Embryos.”348  The form gave the husband and wife the 
opportunity to indicate what the fate of the embryos would be in the event of their divorce, but 
neither party completed that portion of the consent form.349  The second page of the form stated 
in pertinent part, “[m]aximum duration of embryos storage for each group or partial group of 
embryos is not to exceed three years.”350  The contract also provided the facility would send 
notice of intent to destroy the pre-embryos via certified mail when it came time to destroy 
them.351 
                In 2006, the husband filed for divorce.352  He claimed he just created the embryos as a 
“safeguard” and did not intend to have a child with his wife.353  After the husband filed for 
divorce he went on to purposefully have a biological child with another woman and indicated he 
planned to have more children.354   
   The wife, in contrast, had undergone extensive cancer treatment including two surgeries, 
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eight rounds of chemotherapy and thirty-seven rounds of radiation and during the divorce 
hearing and testified that her physicians led her to believe she was unable to now conceive.355 
The Superior Court supported the Master and Trial Court’s finding that the “safeguard” was to 
guard against the very situation where wife could not have a biological child.356  The Court 
determined the husband voluntarily provided wife with sperm when wife’s doctors 
recommended IVF treatment to preserve her fertility.357  The Court found clearly the husband 
knew his participation in IVF was going to result in a child at some point in the future and that 
the only reason one undergoes IVF is to have a child.358  The Court found the agreement made 
between husband and wife for use of the pre-embryos was not contingent on the parties 
remaining married and when given the opportunity to indicate on the form the fate of the 
embryos in the event of divorce, neither party completed that section.359   
 The husband also argued that the trial court should have enforced the provision in the 
consent form that the embryos would be destroyed after three years.360  The Superior Court 
found that the duration section of the signed agreement was between the husband and wife and 
the storage facility about the destruction of the pre-embryos and it was not an agreement between 
the husband and wife that the embryos be destroyed if they became divorced.361  The Court 
stated the contract also provided the clinic would send notice of intent to destroy the pre-
embryos via certified mail when it came time to destroy them.  Husband and wife both testified 
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they had not received notice of destruction.362   
 The husband argued he was being forced to procreate against his will.363  The Superior 
Court, however, agreed with the trial court that Pennsylvania public policy is silent on the issue 
of forced procreation under these circumstances.364  However, other states have adopted policies.  
In Texas, “[t]he consent of a former spouse to assisted reproduction may be withdrawn by that 
individual in a record kept by a licensed physician at any time before placement of eggs, sperm 
or embryos.365  In Florida, absent a written agreement, the decision making authority resides 
jointly with the couple.366  The trial court offered the following analysis about the weight of the 
forced procreation argument: 
We believe that Husband implicitly agreed to procreate with Wife when he agreed 
to undergo IVF, signed the consent form, provided sperm for the creation of the 
pre-embryos and agreed to the fertilization causing the pre-embryos to be created.  
The use of the pre-embryos was never made contingent upon the parties being 
married.  In fact, when provided the opportunity to resolve the fate of the pre-
embryos in the event of divorce neither party completed that portion of the IVF 
form.367   
 
 Given the court did not find a valid contract; the rights of the parties were balanced.368 
Neither party disputed that the court could treat the pre-embryos as marital property.369 In 
weighing the husband’s interest against unwanted procreation, the Court found Pennsylvania law 
silent on the issue of forced procreation under the circumstances before it and found husband had 
not made his voluntary decision to let the pre-embryos be created contingent on remaining 
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married.370  The wife testified that the husband would not need to be concerned that his child 
would not know his biological father, as the wife would allow him to be involved in the child’s 
life if he desired.371   
 The husband was concerned about his financial duty of support.372  The wife’s counsel 
reported extensively about how she would not look to the husband for financial support.373  
Given the wife’s testimony that she would not seek financial support from the husband, the court 
left open the right to determine if the issue of financial support was an actual case or 
controversy.374  The husband’s financial concerns were considered in light of wife’s agreement 
to do her best to assure that the husband never has to pay child support.375  The Superior Court 
concluded that: 
In this case, because the Husband and Wife never made an agreement prior to 
undergoing IVF, and these pre-embryos are likely the Wife’s only opportunity to 
achieve biological parenthood and her best chance to achieve parenthood at all, we 
agree with the trial court that the balancing of interests tips in the Wife’s favor.376   
 
 The Reber court did not recognize that the true balancing test was the wife’s right to 
provide care for her offspring and pursue the happiness of the care and companionship of her 
offspring versus the husband’s right to terminate his parental duties and responsibilities to the 
offspring created by having the life he created terminated.  
W. EVIDENCE THAT A MALE PROGENITOR AGREED WITH THE FEMALE 
PROGENITOR THAT SHE COULD HAVE THE EMBRYOS CREATED, AND 
LACK OF EVIDENCE THAT LEGAL PARENTHOOD WAS FORCED ON THE 
MALE PROGENITOR RESULTED IN THE ILLINOIS COURT HONORING 
THE VERBAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN PROGENITORS PRIOR TO 
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CREATION OF THE EMBRYOS IN SZARFRANSKI V. DUNSTON. 
 
 In Szarfranski v. Dunston, the appellate court reviewed a case that was remanded to 
determine if there was an advance agreement between an unmarried couple as to the embryos 
disposition and if not, to weigh the parties relative interests.377  At issue was a clinic document 
stating: “Embryos are understood to be your property with rights of survivorship. No use can be 
made of these embryos without consent of both parties.”378  The trial and appellate court did not 
find the clinic document countered a prior oral agreement by Szarfranski to allow Dunston to 
have her eggs fertilized with his sperm to create a child.379  Nonetheless, the court also balanced 
the interest of the parties and the appellate court affirmed Dunston would be given the embryos 
and that the “pre-embryos” represent Karla’s last and only opportunity to have a biological 
child.380  Justice Harris, dissenting, reported there was “genuine and understandable sympathy 
for the predicament of one of the parties” and that parties “contemplating issues with significant 
implications such as creating and bringing a child into the world, that they make their intentions 
regarding material concerns clearly known. . . .”381  Neither the court, nor the dissenting Justice, 
mentioned any sympathy for the life created or the justice of leaving human life in storage, or 
terminating innocent life, or deciding the fate of human beings on a clinic form that describes 
them as property.  The case was decided on contract law principles, but the court did not only 
look to the clinic consent form for evidence of party agreement prior to creation of the embryos 
in determining there was an agreement to procreate. 
 Currently, in Illinois the test to resolve embryo disputes will be to analyze what the 
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agreement was between the parties as to the fate of the created embryos and if no agreement 
exists to balance party rights.  The court commented that while it was not ruling on his 
parenthood status, if the unmarried male progenitor did not want to be a father he had a legal 
remedy under Illinois law to be declared a sperm donor.382 
X. A CALIFORNIA TRIAL COURT LACKING ADVOCACY THAT THE 
SUBJECTS OF A DIVORCE DISPUTE, FROZEN EMBRYOS WERE HUMAN 
BEINGS, NONETHELESS FOUND THE EMBRYOS WERE NOT PROPERTY, 
BUT, MISTAKENLY BELIEVED HUMAN BEINGS HAD TO BE “FULLY 
FORMED” TO HAVE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DID NOT RECOGNIZE THEM 
AS CREATED WITH UNALIENABLE RIGHTS, THUS, DECLARING A RIGHT 
NOT TO PROCREATE OF THE FATHER PREVENTED THE MOTHER’S 
RIGHT TO BEAR HER OFFSPRING. 
 
In In re the Marriage of Stephen E. Findley, Petitioner v. Mimi C. Lee, Respondent, The 
Regents of the University of California, there was no advocacy on behalf of the five human 
embryos before the trial court, but nonetheless the court held that “[e]mbryos in this case 
represent the nascent stage of five human lives. They are not property nor are they a fully formed 
human being.  They are, in the construct of the law, sui generis and will be deemed as such in 
this statement of decision.”383   
The court’s holding that human embryos may not be treated as property, is a correct 
understanding of observable scientific facts, but the author of this paper submits the court did not 
fully understand the nature of the embryos when it concluded that human embryos fall short of 
being fully human because they are not “fully formed.”  The human embryos chosen for storage 
are fully formed human beings in accordance with their stage of development.  The court did not 
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recognize that no human beings are “fully formed” at any given age, but undergo continuous 
change from fertilization to death.  A human being develops rapidly initially, but reaches sexual 
maturity only in young adulthood, and psychological maturity even later. Changes continue into 
old age -- e.g., with age spots and senescence -- until death.  The only "fully formed" reality in 
this process is the human organism's unique development plan, initiated at fertilization, which 
directs each person’s growth from fertilization until death.384  
The trial court in Findley recognized that the embryos before it were sui generis 
(unique),385 but could not articulate a valid basis for holding that they were less than fully 
human.  This is not surprising given the lack of any advocacy by the parties (or by anyone else 
on behalf of the embryos) for the position that they are fully human beings.  Nonetheless, the 
trial court in Findley was not presented by the parties with the observed scientific facts about 
what a human organism is, an identifiable human being in existence.  Therefore, Findley should 
not a be considered as legal precedent to deny a parent the right to protect and nurture and care 
for their offspring, as even born children are not fully formed, nor is any human being ever fully 
formed but always forming until death.  The act of procreation by the progenitors was 
completed.  The female progenitor did not argue that the legal issue was whether the government 
through the justice system should protect the human beings created by acting in the embryos best 
interest and allow parental care and nurturing so that their created life could continue and did not 
urge the court to recognize parental rights to protect their children begin at the moment of sperm-
egg binding.  Instead the court mistakenly weighed “procreation rights.” 
Y. IN MCQUEEN V. GADBERRY, THE THE MISSOURI COURT CITED 87 
ALR5TH 253 THAT CLAIMED THE EMBRYO PROPER OR ACTUAL 
EMBRYO DID NOT EXIST UNTIL IMPLANTATION AND DESCRIBED THE 
                                                          
384 Id.  
385 Id. 
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EMBRYO AS “PREEMBRYO”; “HUMAN TISSUE”; “MARITAL PROPERTY 
OF A SPECIAL CHARACTER.” 
 
In 2016, two of three justices in McQueen v. Gadberry, upheld the trial court’s decision to 
treat the embryos as marital property of a special character, finding property to be an external thing 
over which the rights of use are exercised and found the in vitro embryos to be external and human 
tissue.386  The majority opinion referenced the Davis case to support that:  “…frozen pre-embryos 
are unlike traditional forms of property because they are comprised of a woman and man’s genetic 
material, are human tissue, and have the potential to become born children “387 
 The Missouri court also discussed Davis and progeny cases for the idea that each party had 
procreational autonomy rights, a right to procreate and a right not to procreate, not recognizing 
that the human embryos were already procreated and in a stage of early human development.388  
   The resolution model of the Witten Court in Iowa that awarded the embryos jointly to the 
parties, was followed by the trial court and upheld by the Missouri Appeals Court.389  
   The majority opinion that the embryos were ‘tissue” did not acknowledge the observable 
scientific facts known in 2016 that a human embryo is a human organism in development prior to 
implantation in the womb, but instead referenced 87 A.L.R.5th 253, (originally published in 2001), 
reporting:  
 In this case, there was no evidence introduced at trial with respect to the 
science of IVF, related scientific terms, or the division or cell stages of 
the frozen pre-embryos at issue in this case. However, it appears the 
parties do not dispute the facts or science concerning the stages of 
development involved in IVF. As explained in American Law Reports: 
 
. . . Typically, the [IVF] procedure begins with hormonal stimulation of 
a woman’s ovaries to produce multiple eggs. The eggs are then removed 
                                                          
386 McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 148-49 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). 
387 Id. at 157.  
388 Id.at 145-48. 
389 Id. at 157. 
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by laparoscopy or ultrasound-directed needle aspiration and placed in a 
glass dish, where sperm are introduced. Once a sperm cell fertilizes the 
egg, this fusion, or pre-zygote, divides until it reaches the four-to-eight 
cell stages, after which several pre-zygotes are transferred to the 
woman’s uterus by a cervical catheter. If the procedure succeeds, an 
embryo will attach itself to the uterine wall, differentiate, and develop 
into a fetus. As an alternative to immediate implantation, pre-zygotes 
may be cryopreserved indefinitely in liquid nitrogen for later use. ‘Pre-
embryo’ is a medically accurate term for a zygote or fertilized egg that 
has not been implanted in a uterus. It refers to the approximately 14-day 
period of development from fertilization to the time when the embryo 
implants in the uterine wall and the ‘primitive streak,’ the precursor to 
the nervous system, appears. An embryo proper develops only after 
implantation. The term ‘frozen embryos’ is a term of art denoting 
cryogenically preserved pre-embryos. Elizabeth A. Trainor, Annotation, 
Right of Husband, Wife, or Other Party to Custody of Frozen Embryo, 
Preembryo, or Pre-zygote in Event of Divorce, Death, or Other 
Circumstances, 87 A.L.R.5th 253 (originally published in 2001).390  
 
In McQueen, the dissenting justice, James Dowd, indicated that the declaration of Missouri 
law in subsection 1.205, 188.010 and 188.0155 supported the fact that life begins at conception, 
including every stage of biological development, conceptus, zygote, morula, blastocyst, embryo 
and fetus; and that conception is defined as the fertilization of the ovum of a female by the sperm 
of a male.391  The dissent pointed out there was no classification of “marital property of a special 
character” in Missouri law and no Supreme Court decision that justifies the finding that the 
embryos are property.392  Justice Dowd stated that the Thirteenth Amendment removes all human 
beings from the category of property.393 
It is incredulous to the author of this paper that the two majority justices in McQueen can 
claim there was no dispute between the parties as to the facts or science regarding the 
developmental stages involved in IVF, when there is a scientific difference between property such 
                                                          
390 Id. at 133, n.4.  
391 Id. at 158-59.  
392 Id. at 158. 
393 Id. 
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as cells and tissue compared to human organisms, human offspring, identifiable human beings 
distinguishable from parents and sibling embryos as well as born siblings. The father was arguing 
he had procreation rights at issue and yet, procreation rights were already exercised producing four 
human beings.394  The created offspring included the two cryopreserved siblings and the couple’s 
two other children, who were all created at the same time, and cryopreserved at one of the 
biological stages of development as identified by Missouri law Sections 188.010 and 188.015(3) 
and (10).395  Despite the fact that it is known today that the origins of the human body begin prior 
to implantation in the uterus, and that the inner cell mass visualized in the embryos at the blastocyst 
stage of development is desired for embryonic stem cell research, the Missouri court majority 
opinion was referencing old scientific thought that the “embryo proper” developed after 
implantation which is not consistent with current scientific findings.396 
The Missouri Supreme Court denied appeal. The mother announced in a tearful YouTube 
video that she had reached an agreement with her ex-husband that the embryos will be adopted, 
and she wanted to assure their continued life rather than have the United States Supreme Court 
decide their fate, so she was not appealing the case further.397  
Z.  IN LOEB v. VERGARA, PETIONER-FATHER SEEKING CUSTODY OF 
HIS EMBRYOS WAS ORDERED TO IDENTIFY WHOM HE FATHERED 
CHILDREN WITH IN THE PAST AND WHO HAD ABORTIONS, 
RESULTING IN THE PETITIONER FATHER ABANDONING HIS 
CALIFORNIA LAWSUIT. 
 
                                                          
394 Id. at 134.  
395 Id. at 134, n.4.  
396 See Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 779 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. den. U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 12-
454 (2013). 
397 Embryo Defense, Embryo Case Decision, YOUTUBE (May 11, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rw_eUQ2gSpg. 
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 Petitioner Loeb’s contention was that he is the "father" of the female embryos before the 
Court, whom he views as “his daughters,” and that the “Female Embryos have been 
conceived.”398  Loeb and Vergara’s plan was to transfer the embryos to a surrogate mother’s 
uterus.  At some point the embryos were cryopreserved.  Later the parties separated, and 
disagreed over disposition of their embryos, prompting the lawsuit.399  
  Press releases revealed that Respondent, Vergara wanted the embryos to remain 
cryopreserved until either she or Loeb died, at which time the embryos would be thawed “with no 
action taken,” meaning they would not be given the opportunity for further cell metabolism and 
would die.400 
 Loeb sought custody of the embryos, so he could find a surrogate mother to bear them.401 
The parents never intended that Vergara would physically bear the embryos, so a mother’s right 
to choose to bear, or not to bear, a child was not implicated.402 
 According to the complaint, the parties in the informed consent forms they executed to 
engage the IVF clinic’s services never provided a directive for disposition in the event of their 
separation, only a directive for disposition in the event of their death (“thaw with no action”).403 
Loeb further asserted that assigning a disposition upon one event (death) does not govern 
disposition upon a different, uncontemplated event (separation).404  He asserted that he would not 
                                                          
398 Third Amended Complaint at ¶45, Loeb v Vergara, SS 024581 (Ca. Super. Ct. 2014).  
399 Id. at ¶ 1. 
400  Id. at ¶¶ 31-33. See also Danielle & Andy Mayoras, Sofia Vergara Lawsuit Teaches Lesson 
for Couples Seeking IVF, Forbes (2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/trialandheirs/2015/04/21/sofia-vergara-lawsuit-teaches-lesson-for-
couples-seeking-ivf/2/#2d29ad513b74.    
401 Id. at ¶ 1. 
402 Id. at ¶ 15. 
403 Id. at ¶ 84. 
404 Id. at ¶ 80. 
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have selected the disposition (thaw with no action) if he had an inkling that it might be enforced 
in the event of his and Vergara’s separation.405 He also asserted that he signed the form under 
duress.406 Finally, Loeb claimed that the clinic forms are void because they do not list all the 
options, including “donation to another couple” or “other disposition” that the California Code 
requires.407  Loeb requested the court to find that the forms he and Vergara executed were invalid 
and to award him custody of the embryos.408  
 During the discovery phase of litigation, the Petitioner, Loeb was ordered by the court, to 
identify women with whom he had fathered children in the past who subsequently had abortions.409 
The Petitioner stated he would rather go to jail than identify the women who had aborted his prior 
children.410  On December 6, 2016, he dismissed his California lawsuit.  Then on December 7, 
2016 he brought a lawsuit on behalf of his cryopreserved daughters, whom he named Emma and 
Isabella in the state of Louisiana.411  
AA.THE HUMAN EMBRYOS DID NOT HAVE A CASE TO PRESENT IN 
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA WHERE THE COURT LACKED 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE MOTHER.  
 
 In Human Embryo #4 HB-A v. Vergara, Loeb, the father and Plaintiff, filed a lawsuit on 
behalf of his embryonic daughters, Emma and Isabella, in a state where embryos are judicial 
                                                          
405 Id.  at ¶ 77. 
406 Id.  at ¶ 90. 
407 Id. See also §125315 (b) of the California Health & Safety Code. 
408 Id. at Counts V & VI.  
409 Danielle & Andy Mayoras, Embryo Lawsuit Between Sofia Vergara and Nick Loeb Getting 
Out of Hand, FORBES (Nov. 18, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/trialandheirs/2016/11/18/embryo-lawsuit-between-sofia-vergara-
and-nick-loeb-getting-out-of-hand/#5749d8493d65.     
410 Id. at 2. 
411 Human Embryo #4 HB-A v. Vergara, No. 17-1498, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136782 (E.D. La. 
Aug. 25, 2017).  
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people who have the right to sue and be sued and cannot be intentionally destroyed.412  Loeb had 
created a Louisiana Trust in 2016 to benefit Isabella and Emma if they were born alive. 
Plaintiff’s sought: 
(1) A declaratory judgment declaring that the Form Directive is a void and 
unenforceable contract between Loeb and Vergara under California law because it 
does not contain certain required provisions pertaining to the deposition of the pre-
embryos under certain circumstances; 
 
(2) A declaratory judgment declaring that the Form Directive does not control 
decisions regarding the future disposition of Emma and Isabella in the event of 
Loeb and Vergara’s separation because it lacks such provisions, which are required 
by California law. 
 
(3) Rescission of the Form Directive because Loeb signed it under duress; 
 
(4) Rescission of the General Informed Consent as against public policy and Louisiana 
law because it declares that the pre-embryos are property instead of people;  
 
(5) Rescission of the Form Directive for fraud and misrepresentation because, at the 
time the pre-embryos were created through the IVF process, Loeb was relying on 
Vergara’s representations that she wanted them to be transferred to a surrogate; 
 
(6) Declaratory judgment prohibiting Vergara from consenting to the pre-embryos’ 
destruction; 
 
(7) Declaratory judgment mandating that Vergara release the pre-embryos for uterine 
transfer; 
 
(8) Finding a breach of an oral contract between Loeb and Vergara to have the pre-
embryos transferred to a surrogate which has prevented them from being born and 
gaining their inheritance in the Trust; 
 
(9) Finding of tortious interference with the pre-embryos’ ability to inherit from the 
Trust by not permitting them to be transferred to a surrogate; 
 
(10) Appointment of Loeb as the pre-embryos’ curator;  
 
(11) An order declaring Vergara to be an egg donor under California law; and  
 
(12) An order terminating Vergara’s parental rights.413 
                                                          
412 Id. See also La. Rev. Stat. sec. 9:121 et. seq. 
413 Id. at *8-*10.  
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The court did not proceed with the case, however, because it found there was not personal 
jurisdiction over the mother, Vergara, as the cause of action that was alleged in the complaint did 
not arise out of the mother’s contacts with Louisiana and she did not otherwise have enough 
minimum contacts with the state of Louisiana to invoke jurisdiction.414 
BB. ROOK V. ROOKS HELD THAT A FATHER HAD A RIGHT NOT TO 
“PROCREATE” EVEN THOUGH HE ACKNOWLEGED HE WAS THE 
“BIOLOGICAL PARENT’ AND THE TRIAL COURT ACKNOWLEGED 
THAT THE EMBRYOS WERE BIOLOGICALLY AND SCIENTIFICALLY 
LIFE 
 
 The parties, Respondent-Appellant Mandy Rooks and Petitioner-Appellee Drake Rooks, 
while married, used in-vitro fertilization (IVF) to have three children and they also have six 
additional embryos in storage that were created.415  The father then petitioned for divorce.416  He 
asked the court to deliver the six embryos to him for discard.417  The mother seeks their 
preservation for future implantation.418 
 The trial court awarded the embryos to the father, finding them to be property disposable 
under terms of the parties' IVF agreement.419  The trial court alternatively balanced the mother's 
desire for additional children against the father's desire not to continue to be the embryos' father.420 
The court found the father enjoyed a “negative right” to avoid further burdens of genetic 
parenthood and decided that the right outweighed the mother's interest in preserving the 
embryos.421 
                                                          
414 Id. at *17.  
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The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment under a “balancing of interest 
approach.”422  Because no Colorado statute or appellate decision addresses disposition of 
cryopreserved embryos on dissolution of marriage the appellate court looked for persuasive 
guidance to decisions of other jurisdictions.423  The Appellate Court concurred with courts 
adopting a contract approach which enforces a valid agreement of the spouses, and absent 
agreement, balances the spouses' respective interests.424  Here the court, finding no valid 
agreement, balanced the Rooks' interests.425  
 In doing so, the appellate court considered the seminal case of Davis v. Davis, and its 
progeny.  The appellate court held that the trial court could reasonably conclude that the husband’s 
interest in not producing additional offspring outweighed the wife’s interest in having a fourth child, 
citing Davis, and that the husband had a constitutional right “to determine that he does not want to 
have additional children who are joint genetic offspring of husband and wife,” again citing Davis.426  
  Petitioner basically acknowledged the scientific recognition that he created human life 
when he illogically argued that “biological parents’ have the right not to become parents . . . .”427 
This admits he is the biological parent of the embryos before the court.  The court itself found that 
the embryos are “biologically and scientifically ‘life.’”428 (R.CF., p. 232). However, it decided it 
could not hold that the embryos had rights as human persons because Colorado does not count 
                                                          
422 Id. at *6. 
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425 Id. at *36,*38.  
426 Id. at *45, *53. 
427 Petitioner-Appellee Amended Answer Brief at 11, In re Marriage of Rooks, 2016 COA 153. 
428 Brief of American Association of Prolife Obstetricians and Gynecologists as Amicus Curia on 
Behalf of Petitioner Mandy Rooks at 6, In re Marriage of Rooks, 2016 COA 153. 
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unborn children as persons under its criminal laws, child dependency and neglect laws, and 
wrongful death statute.429  
The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari on April 17, 2017, on two issues: 
1. Whether, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, the court of 
appeals erred in its adoption of the balance of interests approach to determine 
the disposition of the parties’ cryogenically frozen pre-embryos in a 
dissolution of marriage. 
 
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in applying an abuse of discretion standard 
of review in reviewing the trial court’s determination of the disposition of a 
couple’s cryogenically frozen pre-embryos in a dissolution of marriage.430  
 
The decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in this case is pending.  
CC. IN KARUNGI V. EJALU, BY THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE 
AGREEMENT “ANY AND ALL DISPUTES RELATAING TO THIS 
AGREEMENT OR ITS BREACH SHALL BE SETTLED BY 
ARBITRATION.” 
 
In Karungi v. Ejalu, the clinic agreement with the parties provided that by “any and all 
disputes relating to this agreement or its breach shall be settled by arbitration.”431  Two of three 
Michigan justices remanded the case back to the trial court for further consideration of the 
applicability of the arbitration clause as to whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction to 
decide the case.432 
  The dissenting justice disagreed that the arbitration applied to disagreements between the 
parties and thought the arbitration clause only applied to any disagreement between the clinic and 
the parties.433  According to the dissenting justice, there was no Michigan law to support the 
proposition that frozen embryos are persons subject to a custody determination, so the dissenting 
                                                          
429 In re Marriage of Rooks, 2016 COA 153, at *11. 
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justice would have granted a summary disposition on the basis the court lacked legal authority to 
consider the disposition of embryos in the context of a custody case.434  
 The concurring opinion thought the majority opinion only decided that the trial court’s 
reasoning that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because it was captioned as a child support 
dispute rather than a custody dispute was misplaced.435  The concurring opinion thought it was 
proper to remand to the trial court for further proceedings and not for anything more.436   
The justice that wrote the majority opinion thought the parties and the trial court both 
ignored the clinic contract where the embryos were defined as joint property of both the recipient 
and partner who were deemed to be the legal owners.437  The majority opinion also commented 
that according to the parties’ agreement with the clinic that stored the embryos, any disputes 
regarding the agreement or its breach would be settled by arbitration and that the trial court should 
have considered this case a contract dispute.438  The opinion stated a family support court would 
also have original jurisdictions in other matters and would not be precluded from resolving the 
contract issue.439  The majority opinion claimed the plaintiff’s arguments were based on a 
misconception that this was a custody dispute rather than a contract dispute and since the case was 
being remanded to the trial court for further proceedings the Appellate Court was not going to 
address the remainder of the plaintiff’s claim.440   
The Michigan Supreme Court denied the appeal. J. McCormick wrote a concurring opinion 
that the fact intensive questions should be decided by the trial court including whether contract 
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law applies, and also stated the trial court should not avoid the question argued by the parties 
whether frozen embryos are persons subject to a custody determination. 
V. CONCLUSION 
    When deciding cases involving disposition of cryopreserved or “frozen” embryos, 
courts continue to rely on precedent based on dicta and erroneous scientific concepts, particularly 
those expressed in Davis v. Davis and its progeny.  Courts also continue to mislabel human 
organisms, existing human beings, as “pre-embryos” with the potential for life as opposed to 
correctly defining them as human life with full potential to complete all of life’s stages from 
conception until death and totally ignoring or disregarding the fact that the term “pre-embryo” is 
unacceptable in the scientific community.  The courts classify the “frozen” “pre-embryos” as a 
form of marital property of a “special character” or “special respect” or entities to be disposed of 
according to clinic consent forms describing the embryos as property, without considering the 
basic human rights and interests or the constitutional rights and interests of the human 
organisms, human beings under the Thirteenth Amendment.  Further, they refuse to recognize 
that once the progenitors have procreated human organisms, human life was created, and 
procreation rights were already exercised as to those particular human organisms, identifiable 
human beings.  Accordingly, the right not to procreate does not exist as to those already created 
human organisms, existing human beings. 
 The time has come for courts to determine the fate of cryopreserved embryos based on 
the scientific truth that they are human organisms, existing human life, entitled to basic human 
rights and the full panoply of constitutional rights under the Thirteenth Amendment, not some 
form of property, that they are not mere human tissue with only a potential for life, and that once 
the progenitors have procreated particular human lives no right not to procreate can exist as to 
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those existing created human organisms. 
The government’s duty is to secure and protect unalienable rights.  Parental rights include 
the right to conceive and raise one’s offspring. Thus, “[t]he rights to conceive and to raise one’s 
children have been deemed ‘essential,’ ‘basic civil rights of man’, and ‘rights far more precious . 
. .  than property rights.”441  
The duty of justice, through the courts, is to properly identify who the subjects are that 
seek governmental protection, and to secure rights and interests of the subject before it, and to 
correctly name the rights and interests on the scale of justice in any embryo dispute.442  What 
needs to be weighed in disputes over human embryos’ fate are human rights and not property 
rights. 
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